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A FRAMEWORK FOR DESIGNING 
CO-REGULATION MODELS WELL-ADAPTED 
TO TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED 
SHARING ECONOMIES 
 Bryant Cannon† & Hanna Chung†† 
Sharing economies, with their vast diversity of goods and services 
offered and rapidly evolving business models, have proven inconducive 
to traditional-regulatory approaches. Yet a complete laissez-faire 
approach or complete ban is not advisable. On the one hand, it is in 
the public interest to allow these new economies to continue to 
innovate, as they create value from unused assets, facilitate useful 
market transactions, and sometimes even lead to the creation of new 
goods and services to improve quality of life. On the other hand, some 
characteristics inherent in the design of sharing economies lead to 
negative externalities, disrupt city planning at the expense of third-
parties, and sometimes even lead to inefficient market allocations or 
protections. Countering the vulnerabilities of government and industry 
requires co-regulation, but co-regulation itself is not a panacea. 
Designing a co-regulatory model that works effectively—addressing 
the blind spots in the market, properly identifying where to intervene 
or refrain, and increasing feasibility by relieving regulatory burden 
and building in flexibility where possible—requires careful 
consideration of the attributes of the sharing economy being targeted 
for regulation. This article identifies a framework for analyzing how to 
design a co-regulatory scheme that can effectively complement the 
inherent attributes of the sharing economies being regulated to 
improve effectiveness, the optimal level of protection of public interests 
over interest groups, and cost-effective feasibility. 
 † Bryant Cannon is a Deputy Attorney General in the Public Rights Division of the 
California Department of Justice. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of the 
California Attorney General’s Office. 
 †† Hanna Chung is a Deputy Attorney General in the Criminal Division of the California 
Department of Justice. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of the California 
Attorney General’s Office. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The sharing economy is a multi-billion dollar economic force that 
has disrupted established markets and created new ones. Known by 
many names—“collaborative consumption,” “asset-light lifestyle,” 
“collaborative economy,” “peer economy,” and “access economy”1—
the sharing economy refers to bringing to market goods and labor that 
are otherwise unutilized during certain time periods: the time a car sits 
in the garage or the extra time an un- or underemployed person may 
have to run errands. For frugal buyers, the shared economy offers goods 
and services in bite-sized units their budgets can stomach.2 This 
economy reflects the convergence of many different types of 
motivations, ranging from an ethos of collaborative consumption and 
waste reduction to profit-seeking entrepreneurial efforts to address 
consumer demand for smaller units of consumption.3  
With shared ownership and use of goods and service providers 
come more complicated economic relationships and dependencies. 
Such cooperative behavior requires well-defined rules.4 For example, 
 1. Sharing-economy pioneer Rachel Botsman identifies the difficulty of defining the 
sharing economy. Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, CO.EXIST 
(Nov. 21, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-
shared-definition (proposing various taxonomies and distinctions between terms used to describe 
the sharing economy). It is also recognized that the term “sharing economy” does not adequately 
capture the capitalistic focus of companies involved, but as the most recognized term for 
describing this phenomena it will be used in this article. See Brad Tuttle, Can We Stop Pretending 
the Sharing Economy is All About Sharing?, MONEY (June 30, 2014), 
http://time.com/money/2933937/sharing-economy-airbnb-uber-monkeyparking (critiquing the 
misleading altruistic connotation of the word “sharing” in the sharing economy, noting that not 
all network-enabled peer-to-peer transactions lead to more efficient use or more egalitarian access 
to resources, and that some practices seem predatory or antisocial in their exploitation of public 
resources). 
 2. Peer-to-Peer Rental: The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing- 
economy (providing examples of peer-to-peer rental putting underused assets to full use by 
lowering the cost of such microtransactions) [hereinafter Rise of the Sharing Economy].  
 3. Compare Andrew Leonard, “Sharing Economy” Shams: Deception at the Core of the 
Internet’s Hottest Businesses, SALON (Mar. 14, 2014, 4:43 AM PDT), http://www.salon.com 
/2014/03/14/sharing_economy_shams_deception_at_the_core_of_the_internets_hottest_busines
ses/ (a cynical op-ed on the rhetoric of value and trust surrounding sharing economies, which, 
according to that writer, hides the solely profit-seeking motives of such businesses), with Benita 
Matofska, What is the Sharing Economy?, THE PEOPLE WHO SHARE, http://www.thepeople 
whoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) (providing a more 
idealistic view of the communitarian values that supposedly define and drive the sharing 
economy).  
 4. See Steven C. Hackett, Heterogeneities, Information, and Conflict Resolution: 
Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts, 6 J. THEORETICAL POL. 495, 495–97 (1994) (noting 
that the interdependency arising from shared resources requires the establishment of rules, but 
that the more heterogeneous the group, the more difficult to agree on a sharing scheme); cf. Eyal 
 
09_ARTICLE_CANNON+CHUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2015  4:41 PM 
26 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
sharing-economy markets depend on a large pool of providers of goods 
and services5 to meet all of the unique demands from buyers. To build 
this large pool of providers, they often solicit nonprofessionals to 
participate as providers by reducing barriers of entry, often blurring 
established regulatory boundaries and creating a vacuum where rules 
for sharing are not clear. The Internet coordinates and convenes buyers 
and sellers, significantly lowering the costs and barriers to aggregating 
supply-and-demand, as when smartphones broadcast locations and 
real-time availability and need.6 However, the low costs of transaction 
may have a negative effect on reasoned consumer decision-making and 
lead to inadequate consumer protections. Although online social 
networks and recommendation systems help to establish trust between 
buyers and sellers and Internet-payment systems protect and facilitate 
transactions, such reputation-based systems require robust privacy 
protections and accuracy safeguards in order for the markets that 
depend on these systems to function as intended.7  
Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign 
Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295–300 (2013) (observing, from a more macroscopic 
cross-national lens, that interdependent relationships arising from shared resources lead to more 
complex and demanding organizational design and legal mechanisms, analogizing the operation 
of such cooperation and the necessity for rules with the rules that govern sharing homes and 
sharing resources in communities). 
 5. DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING 
ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 449, 607 (2010) (observing that products that depend on 
network effects have economic value depending on how many others are also expected to use the 
product, and that products where the utility derives from network effects have positive 
externalities whenever a new user joins the network); Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband 
Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 417, 485 (2009) (“In a network-based industry like communications, the value of 
the network to each user increases with the addition of other users.”).  
 6. Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of 
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1228–32 & 1228 n.73 (2002) (surveying literature 
that lauds or critiques the Internet’s ability to lower transaction costs and warns of its dangers in 
overrunning participants when taking an unregulated “wild west” approach); see MATTHEW O. 
JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS § 7.3.2 (2010) (offering mathematical models 
emulating the diffusion of information in networks where the network structure allows for 
multiple connections of nodes and observing that, where network connections are structured in a 
way that links individuals to other individuals of the same type that could benefit from such 
information—using social information—would greatly improve the chances of information 
quickly reaching the targeted recipient for whom the information was intended). 
 7. See Amy Kristin Sanders & Natalie Christine Olsen, Re-Defining Defamation: 
Psychological Sense of Community in the Age of the Internet, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355,  
356–57, 365 (2012) (referring to other literature likening the spread of information over the 
Internet to the spread of an epidemic and noting the unique potential of the Internet in spreading 
defamatory or inaccurate information over a wider audience). 
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From the perspective of a governmental entity entrusted with 
ensuring public safety, determining if and how to regulate new indus-
tries and business models can be difficult. Because collaborative con-
sumption frequently possesses qualities of both amateur and traditional 
corporate provision of goods and services, the decision whether to 
apply or extend existing regulations to this new activity often devolves 
into semantic disputes—whether a sharing activity qualifies as a taxi 
service, a hotel, or ownership.8 Moreover, sharing economies, which 
grew out of the self-regulatory culture of Internet commerce, may chafe 
against the top-down, centralized regulatory approach of many 
government entities.9  
This article proposes that co-regulation—a regulatory method in 
which government and industry work together to define and enforce 
standards—provides the most appropriate framework for responding to 
the sharing economy’s innovation and disruptive effects. After defining 
the sharing economy and what aspects may need regulation,10 this 
article will (1) identify how existing models of co-regulation do not 
account for the shared economies’ unique characteristics;11 (2) 
articulate how previous regulatory attempts targeting shared-economy 
activities have been problematic or have stymied innovation;12 and (3) 
propose a co-regulatory rubric that would allow regulators and sharing-
economy platforms to evaluate what regulation may be necessary to 
support public goals.13 
 8. Andrés Martinez, Will the Sharing Economy Make Us All Republicans?, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/09/08/will-the-
sharing-economy-make-us-all-republicans/ (arguing that squabbling over semantics to try to carve 
exceptions out of existing-regulatory systems detracts from the impetus to reform what is wrong 
about the underlying regulatory system). 
 9. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for 
Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635, 636–37 
(1999) (noting the general historical view of Internet governance as decentralized and early views 
of keeping regulation decentralized rather than top-down); Richard S. Whitt, Critical Legal 
Studies & the Politicization of Intellectual Property and Information Law: Fashioning a Three-
Dimensional Public Policy Framework for the Internet Age, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 689, 
698–99 (2013) (chronicling the development of the Internet and its increased decentralization and 
characterizing informal rules and the loose values and norms of group members as the “pillars of 
Internet culture”); see Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Cyber Law: Norms, 
Property Rights, Contracting, Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Without the State, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 269, 326, 329 (2005) (concluding that government efforts to regulate Internet 
activity would be futile, after chronicling the development of Internet self-policing). 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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I. EXPLORING THE PROBLEM: WHAT IS THE SHARED ECONOMY 
AND SHOULD WE REGULATE IT? 
A. What is the Shared Economy? 
The sharing economy encompasses many nuances, and the fine 
gradations of sharing property are perhaps better illustrated by story 
than by a precise definition.14 
Suppose you are one of the lucky few to have a car and a desig-
nated place to park in San Francisco. Perhaps when you first moved to 
the city, you anticipated using your car every day. As time progressed, 
you found that the ease of public transportation and the hassle of 
finding parking elsewhere dissuaded you from using the car. It is now 
gathering cobwebs in your parking spot—while insurance costs, rent 
for the parking space, and the monthly payments on the car loan 
continue to accumulate. You consider getting rid of the car and simply 
renting a vehicle for those rare days when you actually need a car to 
travel outside the city or to transport bulky items. In fact, a friend of 
yours has done exactly that. Because daily rental rates at traditional car-
rental services exceed your friend’s budget, she asks to use your car the 
next time she goes shopping, in exchange for handling your groceries 
as well. You happily agree—the arrangement is certainly better for you 
than having the car just sit there. A one-time exchange has occurred 
and she “shares” your car for the day. 
Is this a “sharing economy”? Not quite: there is “sharing” occur-
ring between individuals who already know each other, but no real 
market-facilitated negotiation. Now suppose that your friend begins to 
use the car more regularly. She pays you $20 each time she uses the car 
and keeps the gas tank full. The arrangement works well—she uses the 
car only when you are not, and you are now converting the time the 
care would have otherwise remained unused to a modest, if sporadic, 
source of income. Some time later, your friends—and even their 
friends—hear about this convenient arrangement and ask to borrow 
your car as well. Although you are happy to accommodate your friends, 
you are not so sure about their friends of friends. Your friends, 
however, vouch for their driving skills and you agree to the 
arrangement in exchange for charging a higher price—you need the 
money after all. 
 14. But see Botsman, supra note 1 (describing the taxonomies of collaborative economy, 
categorizing sharing economy as a type of such a collaborative economy, and depicting in an 
abstract, big-picture way what social changes and pressures enable these economies). 
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Now that you are sharing your car with a larger circle of friends 
and following an established exchange arrangement to generate 
income, have you entered the “sharing economy”? It is hard to tell:  
there are some arm’s-length transactions with strangers, but the 
bargaining and the transactions still occur by word-of-mouth and a 
close-knit friend network. Suppose you venture one step further. 
Eventually, you become skilled at managing this lending system. You 
maintain a shared calendar online so that your friends and 
acquaintances know when the car is available. You track payments on 
a spreadsheet. Occasionally, your car is towed or ticketed for parking 
violations, but pressure from your mutual friends keeps people honest. 
After finding that this lending arrangement has worked without hiccups 
so far, you begin to think entrepreneurially. You discover an online car-
sharing marketplace that allows you to lend your car exactly as you 
have been doing already, except that it manages your calendar and your 
payment schedule and provides you with additional insurance 
coverage. You still rent the car to your friends from time-to-time, but 
now you also rent it to total strangers through this car-sharing 
marketplace. Instead of relying on your friends’ referral, you rely on 
online ratings of hundreds of other users regarding problem borrowers. 
You now charge more competitive prices because you noticed that 
most other users on this marketplace charge much higher rates than you 
had charged your friends. Just as borrowers compete with each other to 
rent your car, you compete with other lenders by offering your car to 
this larger market. This, by most definitions, qualifies as an example of 
shared economy, but at what point did we cross the line? 
For the purposes of this article, we look at “shared economies” 
that fit within the following contours: (1) lenders retain permanent 
ownership over the good or labor involved in the service (self-
employed service providers, as opposed to service providers tied to a 
single employer); (2) borrowers pay for the limited use of a good or  
service without purchasing exclusive ownership over the entire good 
or the exclusive right to the service provider’s labor as an employee; 
and (3) facilitated by a digital market-mediating platform, allowing 
both the sellers’ side and the buyers’ side of the market to enjoy low 
barriers of entry such that individuals, however inexperienced in 
entrepreneurship, may easily exchange unused units of capacity with 
other individuals.15 While the first and second points differ only in 
 15. Although some “sharing economy” definitions include data sharing, see, e.g., Gene 
Marks, The Other ‘Sharing’ Economy That’s About to Change the World, FORBES (August 18, 
2014, 10:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-
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degree from the borrowing and lending exchanges that existed in earlier 
eras, the presence of a digital platform is what distinguishes the 
modern-shared economy. For example, while consumers have engaged 
in condo timesharing or the subleasing of apartments for decades,16 the 
rise of online marketplaces with low barriers to participation and 
independent reputational safeguards ushered the development of a 
widespread alternate economy for the exchange of ordinary consumers’ 
excess capacity in almost casual, day-to-day transactions.17 Online 
platforms connect large numbers of lenders and borrowers at a single 
virtual location. Search functions connect parties that match one 
another’s time, location, and price requirements. These platforms 
provide much-needed information-brokering that the lenders and 
borrowers cannot obtain easily on their own: they tabulate lenders’ and 
borrowers’ reputation feedback in real time, offer a baseline of 
insurance and customer service to protect against the largest risks to 
transacting with strangers, and maintain a level of quality control in the 
market pool by filtering out participants with bad ratings.18 Thus these 
economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/ (describing how personal data and preferences has 
become an in-demand commodity), or redistributive markets such as eBay as a method of 
“sharing” and reducing overconsumption, see, e.g., Rachel Botsman & Roo Rogers, Beyond 
Zipcar: Collaborative Consumption, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2010, at 30, 30, available at 
http://hbr.org/2010/10/beyond-zipcar-collaborative-consumption/ar/1 (including redistributive 
markets in the overview of types of sharing), we narrow our focus to address only economic 
relationships in which multiple parties share access to a good or service while one party retains 
ownership. Such interwoven relationships introduce unique legal concerns involving the 
coexistence of rights, rather than the transfer of rights associated with redistributive markets and 
the traditional purchase-sale transaction. We see this coexistence as a key point for capturing the 
legal challenges unique to the shared economy. For a more comprehensive definition and 
categorization of “collaborative economy,” including those economies beyond the scope of the 
focus of this article, see Botsman, supra note 1. 
 16. Ellen R. Peirce & Richard A. Mann, Time-Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Regulatory Environment, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 9, 9–11 (1983) (reviewing 
the development of timesharing arrangements up to the 1980s and the regulations that have formed 
to govern these sharing arrangements). 
 17. See TEXAS A&M TRANSP. INST., REAL-TIME RIDESHARING (2014), http://mobility 
.tamu.edu/mip/strategies-pdfs/travel-options/technical-summary/real-time-ridesharing-4-pg.pdf 
(explaining how smartphone applications facilitate pairing riders and drivers for ridesharing, 
noting that these real-time sharing applications expand what people had already coordinated in a 
smaller scale without technology); Sanders & Olsen, supra note 7, at 358 (describing how the rise 
of the Internet has linked users across geography and spreads information about reputation outside 
the confinement of limited circles); Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: 
Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 303, 307 n.8, 344 (2008) (noting the low barriers to entry in online business to 
consumer markets but also noting the increased competition and difficulty of creating a 
traditional-established presence, such as brand recognition). 
 18. See SELMAR MEENTS, THE INFLUENCE OF SELLERS AND THE INTERMEDIARY ON 
BUYERS’ TRUST IN C2C ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES 73–75, 86–89 (2009) (describing the risks 
of online transactions and the prerequisites of seller trust and intermediary trust for an online 
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online platforms fulfill dual-roles: they expand the market to include 
ordinary unsophisticated lenders and borrowers while countering the 
usual disincentives for dealing with strangers by creating risk-reducing 
and trust-building mechanisms such as a reputation-ratings system and 
an insurance net.19 Such platforms include product-service systems that 
facilitate timesharing of goods (e.g., car sharing, golf club rentals, 
piano practice-time rentals, or even currency), real-estate sharing 
systems (e.g., parking space, workspace, commuter bedrooms), and 
collaborative service-sharing systems (e.g., babysitting, tutors, other 
private contractors).20 
B. Why Regulate? Challenges Unique to a Sharing Economy 
The digital-sharing economy generally facilitates more efficient 
allocation of existing resources. In theory, a well-functioning shared 
economy reduces overconsumption of goods and, by recycling unused 
goods and labor, reduces prices and scarcity of these goods and services 
in the consumer market. Solving social problems associated with 
overconsumption and allowing access to goods and services at a lower 
cost clearly benefits consumers.21 
consumer-to-consumer marketplace to function); Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise 
of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomio 
geron/2013/01/23/%20airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/ (explaining how 
this new economy “allows everyone to be both consumer and producer” by monetizing microunits 
of capacity that were not originally marketable, connecting individual buyers and sellers). 
 19. Erica Swallow, The Rise of the Reputation Economy, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2013, 
8:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericaswallow/2013/10/09/reputation-economy (outlining 
efforts of sharing-economy companies to build reputation markers to assure its market participants 
of the safety of the transaction); Jason Tanz, What Makes or Breaks Startups in the Sharing 
Economy? Insurance Rates, WIRED (Apr. 28, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04 
/sharing-economy-insurance/ (describing the process by which companies recompense users 
upfront for negative experiences to minimize risk, then negotiate with insurance companies in 
bulk behind the scene based on these compensation, all in the name of building consumer trust in 
their platforms and their facilitated peer-to-peer sharing). One startup seeks to create trust 
reputations transferable across platforms. See Measure Trust, TRUSTCLOUD, 
https://trustcloud.com/measure-trust (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (explaining and summarizing 
graphically how the company consolidates data from multiple online-community sources to give 
an individual’s consolidated-online identity a trust profile). 
 20. Other taxonomies of the sharing economy exist. See, e.g., JEREMIAH OWYANG WITH 
CHRISTINE TRAN & CHRIS SILVA, ALTIMETER, THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY 7 (2013), 
available at http://www.slideshare.net/Altimeter/the-collaborative-economy; Jeremiah Owyang, 
Framework: Collaborative Economy Honeycomb, WEB-STRATEGIST BLOG (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/05/05/framework-collaborative-economy-honeycomb 
-osfest14/. 
 21. For example, ride sharing has the potential of reducing traffic congestion when it puts 
unused-car space to good use by increasing carpooling, see Henry Grabar, How to Save America 
from Cars: Start Sharing Them, SALON (Sept. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM PDT), http://www.salon.com 
/2014/09/07/how_to_save_america_from_cars_start_sharing_them/, and it may reduce the 
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Self-regulation proponents argue that companies and industries 
will implement protective standards and the pitfalls of government 
regulation are avoidable.22 Industry members are uniquely positioned 
to identify the most effective and efficient means of protecting the 
safety of their consumers.23 Furthermore, regulatory updating is more 
efficient under this model because industry members are better able to 
predict future technologies and business developments and to design 
standards that can accommodate changes.24 Finally, industry tends to 
comply more readily with rules designed and imposed by their peers.25 
However, sharing economies may exacerbate two types of 
inefficiencies. First, from a resource-allocation perspective, sharing 
economies incentivize market participants into purchasing unused 
capacity for the purpose of renting them in smaller allotments.26 This 
amount of space that a city uses for parking. See TEXAS A&M TRANSP. INST., CARPOOLING 1 
(2014), http://mobility.tamu.edu/mip/strategies-pdfs/travel-options/technical-summary/Carpool 
ing-4-Pg.pdf. But, by that same logic, if ride sharing were to function in such a way that it simply 
increased the number of cars functioning as taxis on the road, carrying one customer at a time, 
then the sharing is illusory and the overconsumption and congestion problems remain. 
 22. See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the 
Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/10/from 
-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/ (summarizing 
common reasons given for keeping the sharing economy free from regulation, including the 
argument that reputation–incentives remedy market failures common to the non-sharing 
counterpart business models and that industry-policing private institutions can do the job better 
than government regulators).  
 23. Id. (finding group sanctions and group monitoring more informative, more revealing, 
and therefore more effective than government regulation). 
 24. Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, 
or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 458 (2011) (reporting that proponents of industry 
self-regulation contend that industry members are better able to predict future technologies and 
business developments and that industry is better poised to design standards that can remain 
flexible to changes); Arun Sundararajan, Trusting the ‘Sharing Economy’ to Regulate Itself, N.Y. 
TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:01 AM), http:// 
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/trusting-the-sharing-economy-to-regulate-itself/?_php 
=true&_type=blogs&smid=tw-share&_r=0 (discussing the built-in real-time mechanisms that 
help sharing-economy companies monitor developments and adjust to market failures with 
relative ease, whereas the same kind of oversight and responsiveness would place a heavy strain 
on government resources); see Scott Shane, Tread Lightly on Regulating the Sharing Economy, 
ENTREPRENEUR (May 13, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/233812 (arguing that 
traditional companies operating under nonsharing-business models are calling for regulation out 
of protectionist motives, that consumers are not voicing such demands, and that government 
regulators should not cave into these companies’ pressure). 
 25. Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 716 
(1999) (“It is thought that if rules are developed by the industry, industry participants are more 
likely to perceive them as reasonable. Companies may be more willing to comply with rules 
developed by their peers rather than those coming from the outside.”). 
 26. For example, critics have blamed home-sharers in San Francisco for converting a 
percentage of the limited supply of full-time single-family housing in the city into part-time hotels. 
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trend could deplete the supply of the goods in question for those other 
market actors interested in complete ownership or control. This may 
lead to price increases, inefficient overconsumption, and the selection 
of alternatives whose opportunity cost presents broader negative 
externalities.27 For example, landlords and housing advocates complain 
that home-sharing platforms like Airbnb allow entrepreneurs to 
purchase multiple homes and apartments in cities such as San Francisco 
or New York City where a high demand for full-time housing coexists 
with a high demand for tourist lodging. They allege that Airbnb 
incentivizes the conversion of a city’s limited supply of housing into 
day-by-day rentals, resulting in more housing lying unused overall.28 
The data suggests that most Airbnb rentals appear to be for entire units 
rather than spare bedrooms. The users with the most properties listed 
are property-management companies with multiple house and 
apartment listings, hotels, and supposed “individuals” who have posted 
multiple properties.29 As another example, consider the possibility that 
employers may elect to hire services on a per-task basis rather than 
creating more full- or part-time jobs with stability and benefits. Under 
See Natalie Rodriguez, 4 Flashpoints in SF’s Plan to Regulate Airbnb, Others, LAW360 (August 
06, 2014, 9:22 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/563982/4-flashpoints-in-sf-s-plan-to-
regulate-airbnb-others (relating San Francisco Planning Commission’s concern that home-sharing 
will drive up property costs and reduce housing availability); Lydia O’Connor, Landlords Accused 
of Kicking Out Tenants to List on Airbnb, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2014, 12:59 PM EDT), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/24/airbnb-ellis-act-lawsuit_n_ 
5202038.html (accusing landlords of evicting long-term residents to list their properties as short-
term rentals and exacerbating long-term housing shortage in city). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Dara Kerr, Vexed in the City: The ‘Sharing’ Economy’s Hidden Toll on San Francisco, 
CNET (Aug. 20, 2014, 4:00 AM PDT), http://www.cnet.com/news/vexed-in-the-city 
-the-sharing-economys-hidden-toll-on-san-francisco/ (reporting that most rentals on Airbnb are 
of entire houses and apartments and that many users list multiple properties, suggesting that such 
“sharing” platforms are taking from available permanent housing stock and converting them to 
short-term use, exacerbating the housing shortage).  
 29. Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact on S.F., S.F. 
CHRONICLE, http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/item/Window-into-Airbnb-s-hidden-impact-
on-S-F-30110.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (reporting statistics released on the types of San 
Francisco-postings offered on Airbnb); Carolyn Said, S.F. Planners Support, Toughen ‘Airbnb 
Law,’ S.F. GATE (Aug. 9, 2014, 7:02 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/S-F-plan 
ners-support-toughen-Airbnb-law-5677368.php#photo-6702358 (reporting on housing advo-
cates’ concerns that the shared economy for temporary housing has reduced permanent-housing 
supply and discussing negotiations to legalize house-sharing platforms in exchange for tighter 
regulation on remitting hotel taxes and limiting the conditions under which renting out one’s home 
is possible); David Streitfeld, Companies Built on Sharing Balk When It Comes to Regulators, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22 
/business/companies-built-on-sharing-balk-when-it-comes-to-regulators.html?_r=0 (detailing the 
controversy of apartment-sharing companies, the large number of professional “sharers,” and their 
impact on the scarcity of New York housing).  
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such a hiring model, service providers in the sharing economy may 
spend hours bidding for one-off gigs and becoming dependent on 
unpredictable sources of work, at the opportunity cost of searching for 
more substantive, reliable employment.30 The sharing economy may 
incentivize service-ready employees to break up the time they would 
otherwise have available for full-time jobs, pursuing gigs and leaving 
long periods of nonworking time in between.31 
Second, the increased availability of goods and services comes 
with significant externalities. While low-transaction costs create low 
barriers of entry and permit high market participation, the higher 
number of participants in the new market comes at the price of 
shedding market safeguards. The low safeguards, in turn, make act-
now-and-ask-for-forgiveness-later strategies prevalent among sharing-
economy companies.32 Borrowers in the shared economy, like 
consumers in any market, may underestimate their risk exposure and 
demand less than the optimal amount of market safeguards.33 For 
example, a person offering her apartment on Airbnb may check that the 
platform offers some level of vouching and background-checks to 
ensure the trustworthiness of the guest, but she may not think to inquire 
into the property-damage insurance coverage. The offeror may neglect 
the possibility that even well meaning, trustworthy guests may 
inadvertently create damage. Moreover, both the offeror and the renter 
 30. Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and 
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2014, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014 
/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html 
(reporting on the daily working routines of sharing economy workers who look for gigs on a day-
to-day basis and work long hours to make ends meet in lieu of the predictable income of a full-
time job). 
 31. Andrew Leonard, Why Uber Can’t Be Stopped, SALON (Jan. 13, 2014, 11:07 AM PST), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/01/13/uber_and_the_neo_luddites (noting that along with capitalists 
catering to consumer demand and innovating to improve quality of life comes the lowering of 
labor costs and, if taken to the extreme, a culture where “everyone is a part-timer”). 
 32. Jason Clampet, Sharing Homes, Cars—and Lawsuits, BBC (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/travel/feature/20140501-sharing-homes-cars-and-lawsuits (characterizing 
the initial attitudes of sharing-economy businesses as “sin-first, ask-forgiveness-later”); J.B. 
Wogan, How Will the Sharing Economy Change the Ways Cities Function?, GOVERNING THE 
STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES (Oct. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/urban/gov-how 
-sharing-economy-will-change-cities.html (describing the norm of setting-up shop and 
negotiating with regulators later, given the ambiguous legality landscape); cf. Whitt, supra note 
5, at 483 (connecting low barriers of entry to increase of competitors). 
 33. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and 
Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 505–20 & n.91 (2002) (providing an overview of common-
consumer irrationalities, such as optimism bias, desirability bias, the illusion of control, 
underestimation of indirect effects). 
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of the apartment may altogether ignore the effects of their transactions 
on third-parties.34 
The confluence of low barriers to entry, inexperience, and discrete 
on-the-spot transactions results in an “incentives gap.” The gap refers 
to the insufficiency of the natural incentives that inexperienced market 
actors—the weekend-entrepreneurs and one-time borrowers—have to 
self-impose an optimal level of forethought and safeguards: that is, to 
address failed sharing relationships, manage risk, address externalities, 
and build-in minimum consumer protection and labor baselines in a 
way that maintains the long-term viability of the alternate economy.35 
This is where the actors who do have long-term incentives—the 
marketplace platform developers and government regulators charged 
with protecting the public—must step-in to correct the externalities and 
information asymmetries that yield inefficient outcomes and 
insufficiently protect the participants of the market.36 
 34. Margie Shafer, Uber, Lyft Announce Insurance Policy Changes Following Fatal Crash 
Involving Rideshare Driver, CBS BAY AREA (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:44 PM), http:// 
sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/03/14/uber-lyft-announce-insurance-policy-changes-following 
-fatal-crash-involving-rideshare-driver/ (reporting that ride-sharing company initially denied 
insurance liability for accidents incurred while drivers are not carrying customers but later 
addressed “insurance gap” after receiving public criticism for fatal accident involving third-party 
pedestrian). 
 35. See All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (March 9, 2013, 4:08 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21572914-collaborative-consumption-
technology-makes-it-easier-people-rent-items (stating that insurance questions, legal liability, 
theft and destruction of property, fatal-car accidents were all snags for sharing enterprises or 
unexpected consequences for sharing-service customers); Video, Sharing Economy Participants 
Often Unaware of Risks—VRMA, REUTERS VIDEO, (July 31, 2014, 6:49 AM), http://www 
.reuters.com/video/2014/08/01/sharing-economy-participants-often-unawa?videoId=330813074 
(“Mark McSweeney, Executive Director of the Vacation Rental Managers Association,” lists a 
“guest-turned-squatter” among “cautionary tale[s] to the sharing economy”). 
 36. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43–47 (5th ed. 2008) 
(describing four types of market failures that may require correction, including externalities and 
severe-information asymmetries); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 23–37, 83–86 (2008) 
(cataloguing irrational-human behavior that affects economic choices, leading to market 
imperfections and a possible need for market intervention and “choice architects”—those who 
engineer the environment in which people make decisions to affect their choices). 
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C. Addressing the Incentives Gap and Resulting Market 
Inefficiencies  
1. Customer Protection and Liability Allocation 
The incentives gap introduces potential market inefficiencies in 
four areas. The first is in customer protection and liability allocation.37 
Because the spot transactions may occur at near instantaneous speed—
in the click of a mouse or the tap of a smartphone screen—most 
consumers will underestimate the optimal level of safeguards they need 
against unintended consequences.38 The low barriers to entry and exit 
result in a large number of non-professional participants with no 
ongoing obligation to remain active in the marketplace.39 Such 
participants have an incentive to supply whatever level of protection 
the consumers demand at the time, without looking ahead to 
unanticipated risks beyond the current transaction. For example, an 
amateur masseuse may see little harm in practicing his hobby on a 
willing purchaser of his services—until a dissatisfied customer 
unexpectedly sues him for allegedly aggravating her injury. The 
amateur service-provider might not have thought to set ground rules 
governing his relationship with the customer in advance, either because 
he overestimated his abilities or underestimated the risks and 
consequences of a negative experience. However, the online platform 
 37. Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing 
Economy, 58 BOS. B. J. 6, 7 (2014) (providing an overview of major-legal issues and including 
consumer protection, insurance, and taxation as among them); M.P. McQueen, Beware the 
Liability of Sharing Your Car with Strangers, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2013, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2013/10/15/beware-the-liability-of-sharing-your-car 
-with-strangers/ (focusing on inadequate liability protections as an area where a major gap exists 
between consumer needs and company willingness to offer). 
 38. See, e.g., Carolyn A. Lin, Interactive Media Technology and Shopping, in 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS 215, 217 
(David J. Atkin et al. eds., 2014) (stating that online shoppers form underdeveloped sense of self-
regulation and can take under-informed risks due to the utility and speed of online transactions); 
see also Wogan, supra note 32 (describing how smartphones provide near-instantaneous potential 
commercial matchups between buyers and sellers). 
 39. See Jeff Altheide, Share and Share Alike, G&S BUS. COMMC’N (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.gibbs-soell.com/news_article/?id=94&news=share_and_share_alike (comparing 
levels of sharing, in economy, to the three physical states, solid, liquid, and gas, with gaseousness 
being too unpredictable to be sustainable, implying that transience of economic participants could 
be problematic); cf. Adam Fish et al., Birds of the Internet: Towards a Field Guide to the 
Organization and Governance of Participation, 4 J. CULTURAL ECON. 157, 160–62 (2011) 
(stating that organizations and their members, as opposed to publics made up of non-members not 
belonging to organizations, have been assumed to decrease uncertainty and reduce transaction 
costs, but the internet causes organizations to be more “ephemeral” with the increase of “freelance 
work, serious amateurs, casualized labor forces,” and “[s]ocial entrepreneurialism and Free 
Software/Free Culture movements”). 
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that facilitated the transaction may have a long-term incentive to build 
in mediation processes, manage expectations, or enforce some level of 
quality control as a part of its business model. Indeed, part of the appeal 
of the shared economies burgeoning online are the low transaction 
costs—someone else has thought of the details, so that the consumer 
may have instant gratification in obtaining a local good or service and 
the lender may have instant gratification in procuring a “taker” as soon 
as she offers her spare time or resources to the public.40 
2. Labor Restrictions 
Second, the incentives gap may also account for non-optimal 
levels of labor regulation. On the one hand, the transparency and 
comparative bargaining flexibility of an online marketplace may justify 
a Lochner-era aversion to overly paternalistic labor regulations,41 and 
participants focused on short-term transactions may opt for the 
minimum level of labor restrictions.42 On the other hand, not all labor 
restrictions are purely protectionist or rent-seeking. Just as trucking 
regulations cap truckers’ driving hours in the interest of public safety, 
labor regulations that limit hours may help the market correct market 
participants’ biases undervaluing the harm to third-parties.43 As a 
society, we may also seek to enforce certain baseline restrictions on 
selling personal services on online-sharing platforms as a matter of 
public policy. For example, we may wish to enforce child-labor 
restrictions, regardless of whether a particular child voluntarily offers 
 40. See Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 2 (noting that technology has cut 
transaction costs, making asset sharing much easier); see also Maureen Conway, The Downside 
to Lower Labor Costs in the Sharing Economy, ASPEN INST. (August 29, 2014), 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/about/blog/downside-lower-labor-costs-sharing-economy (shared-
economy companies can circumvent usual-labor costs such as benefits, unemployment insurance, 
workers’ comp, and wages, and avoid business risks by shifting them to those who are sharing the 
service or good). 
 41. See People v. Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (holding that, according to the aversion 
to economic paternalism in vogue in that era, placing limitations on permissible- commercial 
agreements from consenting individuals is beyond the scope of the state’s police powers). 
 42. Singer, supra note 30 (relating the story of a working mother’s herculean effort to work 
long-hours in the unpredictable-gig economy to make ends meet but also reporting that the net 
earnings may average out to be less than minimum wage and preclude a career or decrease the 
supply of full-time employment). 
 43. See, e.g., Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin. v. Distribution LTL Carriers Ass’n, 374 
F.3d 1209, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (criticizing as a safety hazard new laws that increase maximum 
hours driving permitted); HASKEL D. HARRISON ET AL., SPARKS BUREAU OF BUS. AND ECON. 
RESEARCH, LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF COMPLIANCE, SAFETY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (CSA) 
ON THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY: SUPPLY AND DEMAND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE (2012), 
www.memphis.edu/ifti/pdfs/cifts_labor_impacts_of_csa.pdf. 
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to do marathon hours of babysitting on a job board like Care.com or 
TaskRabbit.44 
3. Reliability of Online Reviews and Trust-Building 
Mechanisms 
Third, the incentives gap may introduce imperfections into the 
feedback and trust-building mechanisms that constitute the very 
backbone of the shared economy. The marketplace generally benefits 
from honest and frequent reviews, including prompt reports of bad 
experiences. Consumers, incentivized by a soapbox-effect and a desire 
for community building and recognition, may gladly post positive and 
negative reviews of restaurants, hotels, and companies.45 
But what happens when both suppliers and consumers depend on 
one another for reviews? A lender, borrower, buyer, or seller depends 
on his online reputation. Because a negative review may have a 
devastating effect on one’s ability to fetch the best prices, each market 
participant has the power to blackmail others with the threat of a 
negative review.46 Rather than face mutually assured destruction, par-
ticipants are incentivized to soften their negative reviews, even though 
the community as a whole would benefit from flagging negative 
experiences honestly.47 In a real-life variant of the ultimatum game, a 
participant who dares to post a negative review may be punished by a 
reciprocating negative review, even if the reciprocator has nothing to 
gain by sabotaging the other reviewer.48 Other disincentives for 
expressing negativity exist, including recent attempts to sue negative 
 44. See generally Gordon Betcherman et al., Child Labor, Education, and Children’s 
Rights (Soc. Protection Discussion Series Paper No. 0412, 2004), http://siteresources.worldbank 
.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Labor-Market-DP/0412.pdf 
(child labor discouraged as a matter of social policy). 
 45. Edward F. McQuarrie, Shelby H. McIntyre & Ravi Shanmugam, What Motivates 
Consumers to Produce Online Reviews? Solidarity, Status, and the Soapbox Effect 13–15 (Social 
Science Research Network, Working Paper Series, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2210707. 
 46. See Tom Slee, Some Obvious Things About Internet Reputation Systems, WHIMSLEY 
(Sept. 29, 2013), http://tomslee.net/2013/09/some-obvious-things-about-internet-reputation-sys 
tems.html#fn.5; Jeff Bercovici, Uber’s Ratings Terrorize Drivers And Trick Riders. Why Not 
Fix Them?, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014, 12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014 
/08/14/what-are-we-actually-rating-when-we-rate-other-people/; Chrysanthos Dellarocas et al., 
Self-Interest, Reciprocity, and Participation in Online Reputation Systems (MIT Center for 
eBusiness, Paper No. 205, 2004), http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers/205_dellarocas_ebay 
participation.pdf. 
 47. Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels, Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the 
Production of Reputation Information, 59 MGMT. SCI. 265, 268 (2012). 
 48. Id. 
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reviewers for libel.49 These disincentives against negative reviews may 
result in market inefficiencies because users’ ratings understate the 
negative experiences and risks associated with the transaction and slow 
the reporting of all but the most egregious unacceptable behavior.50 
Some low-risk activities, such as sharing tools or a parking space, may 
allow for enough trial-and-error so that participants may be willing to 
rely entirely on the community feedback to decide whom to trust. But 
other more high-risk activities, such as finding a babysitter or loaning 
out a more expensive item long-term, may involve such low margins 
for error that supplemental screening mechanisms, free-speech 
protections, and liability-insurance minimums should be enforced to 
compensate for the incentive gaps that lead to such skewed data and 
the increased risks introduced by inaccuracies in the data. 
On the other extreme of bias, an unfortunate early negative review 
could sabotage an otherwise viable market participant because viewers 
may make early and lasting judgments based on the limited sample that 
is readily available and visible. For example, a market participant who 
receives an early bad review, such as when a just-opened restaurant 
receives a negative review as its first review, may struggle to gain 
future customers or good reviews, even though he or she makes 
significant improvements.51 As several studies have noted, individuals 
will give bad reviews for counterintuitive motives, introducing 
misinformation into the market.52 Although market participants have a 
strong incentive to root out dishonest reviews—indeed, some 
communities allow participants to flag posts that offend the community 
at large or do not fit the purpose of feedback in that community (e.g., 
spam, disguised advertising)—they are ill-equipped to judge the 
reliability of a targeted bad review purportedly grounded on personal 
experience (e.g., a bad review based on a peer-to-peer transaction, of 
which only the participants have direct knowledge). Market 
inefficiency results: those with retaliatory motives can taint the 
information that drives market dynamics, where the average partic-
ipant, though sufficiently incentivized to filter out bad information, 
 49. See Adam Cohen, Online Reviewers Beware: You Can Get Sued, TIME (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://ideas.time.com/2013/01/07/yelp-reviewers-beware-you-can-get-sued/.  
 50. See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Uber Anxiety: When Your Car Service is Judging You Back, 
N.Y. MAG. DAILY INTELLIGENCER (June 4, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelli 
gencer/2014/06/uber-anxiety.html. 
 51. WEIJIA DAI, GINGER JIN, JUNGMIN LEE & MICHAEL LUCA, OPTIMAL AGGREGATION 
OF CONSUMER RATINGS: AN APPLICATION TO YELP.COM (2014), http://www.people.hbs.edu 
/mluca/OptimalAggregation.pdf. 
 52. See, e.g., Eric T. Anderson & Duncan I. Simester, Reviews Without a Purchase: Low 
Ratings, Loyal Customers, and Deception, 51 J. MARKETING RES. 249 (2014). 
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does not have the proper knowledge or authority to do so. At the same 
time, platform providers may have their own profit-driven incentives 
to manipulate user reviews, especially if they profit from these 
skewings.53 As participants’ income, community involvement, and 
ability to transact becomes increasingly dependent on online 
reputation, safeguards may be necessary to ensure that a few 
individuals or competitors do not have the ability to destroy others’ 
reputations. 
4. No Reason for Market Participants to Consider 
Externalities 
Fourth, participants may lack an adequate incentive to consider 
the disruptive economic effects of their conduct, especially on 
traditional areas of taxation and revenue generation for local 
governments (in particular ones that go to social or municipal 
services).54 Granted, not all forms of taxation survive a shift in 
economic activity. Regulators, upon noticing the demise of revenue 
streams from horse and buggy taxes, would not ban automobiles—they 
would impose a motor vehicle tax. Similarly, the rise of disruptive 
economies may force existing companies to make room for competition 
 53. See Galen Moore, Small Businesses Say Yelp Skewed Reviews to Punish Non-
Advertisers, BOS. BUS. J. (Jan 25, 2013, 8:37 AM EST), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston 
/blog/mass_roundup/2013/01/yelp-reviews-skewed-for-advertisers.html (reporting many com-
plaints to the Federal Trade Commission from small businesses claiming that Yelp purposely 
manipulated reviews it allows on display based on whether the business agrees to advertise with 
them); Brad Tuttle, Guess Who’s Getting Some Pretty Awful Reviews: User Review Sites, TIME 
(Sept. 21, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/09/21/guess-whos-getting-some-pretty-awful-re 
views-user-review-sites/ (reporting on accusations that Yelp and other review sites manipulate the 
visibility of positive reviews or page location based on whether the business is willing to pay extra 
or pay for advertising, and noting the stakes when business revenue is correlated with major user-
review sites). But see Sudhin Thanawala, Court Rules for Yelp in Suit Over Online Ratings,  
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 11:24 AM PDT), http://www.mercurynews.com 
/california/ci_26467676/court-rules-yelp-suit-over-online-ratings (reporting appellate court’s 
decision to uphold dismissal over an extortion lawsuit, holding that even if Yelp were sorting or 
dropping businesses based on whether they agreed to advertise on Yelp, it does not amount to 
extortion).  
 54. See Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the ‘Sharing Economy’ Hype: Airbnb and Uber are 
Facilitating Rip-offs, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014, 7:30 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation (characterizing sharing-economy 
companies as tax evaders or facilitators of scofflaws). But see Adam Ozmiek, Is the Sharing 
Economy Just a Scam to Dodge Good Regulations?, FORBES (June 23, 2014, 11:53 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2014/06/23/is-the-sharing-economy-just-a-scam 
-to-dodge-good-regulations (offering to distinguish between antisocial evasion of socially 
beneficial law and ability to dodge outdated laws propped up by regulatory capture, based on 
whether the new business models are innovating in a way to eliminate the externalities and to 
show that the law is not needed). 
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because the old ways of enforcing artificial monopolies or collecting 
taxes no longer apply. Whatever the traditional reasons for taxing a 
given economic activity (e.g., compensation for usage of public 
resources, licensing fees for maintaining safety and quality controls, or 
simply a revenue stream), regulators and platform developers must 
work together to negotiate a clear course of action for the individual 
market participants. The market participants themselves, however, are 
too diffuse to negotiate on a concerted front or advocate for the long-
term legitimacy of the economic activity. Therefore, regulators (who 
have in mind the solvency of the government) must work together with 
platform developers (who have a long-term interest in building 
legitimacy for their activity, reassuring participants of the legality of 
their investment into the platform, and streamlining a process for 
handling inevitable government relations questions such as taxable 
activity). 
The existence of incentive gaps and market inefficiencies help to 
explain why shared-economy enterprises may benefit from some level 
of intervention into the market, beyond what a shared-economy 
community consisting of market participants may naturally do to self-
regulate. The next section explores what sort of intervention attempts 
that governments have made to date. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE THE 
TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED SHARING ECONOMY 
Given the previous section’s exploration of the market shortfalls 
that may necessitate regulatory intervention, it is not surprising that 
regulators have increasingly targeted the sharing economy’s major 
players with litigation or bans addressing the activity’s impact on 
consumer safety and diminishing tax revenue. California, a state that 
has served as an incubator for many of the new sharing-economy 
companies, has played a central role in developing new regulatory 
approaches. In September 2013, California became the first state to 
issue decisions that recognized ride sharing as a legitimate- 
transportation service.55 The regulations presage a similar evolution at 
 55. Decision Establishing Rules and Regulations for Transportation Network Companies, 
Decision No. 13-09-045 (Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov 
/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K192/77192335.PDF; Alistair Barr, ‘Sharing Economy’ 
Gets a Boost in California, USA TODAY (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:06 PM EDT), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/09/19/sharing-economy-california/2838343/; Tomio 
Geron, California Becomes First State to Regulate Ridesharing Services Lyft, Sidecar, UberX, 
FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/cali 
fornia-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-ridesharing-services-lyft-sidecar-uberx/. 
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the local level as cities that previously may have sought to ban or 
eliminate sharing-economy companies from operating in their juris-
diction re-evaluate their regulatory options. In April 2014, the President 
of San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors introduced a proposed 
ordinance that would govern short-term housing-rentals platforms like 
Airbnb. The law, developed in collaboration with Airbnb as well as 
others in the house-sharing industry, applies to short-term housing 
rentals and was ultimately passed in October 2014.56 Similarly, in 
September 2014, California enacted legislation establishing minimum 
insurance requirements for ride-sharing companies like Lyft and 
Uber.57 
Sharing-economy companies did not always entertain the 
applicability of regulations to their business models. Historically, their 
approach had been to act first and ask for forgiveness later. For 
example, Airbnb once argued that existing laws, such as room taxes 
typically applicable to hotels, were “outdated” and did not apply to 
sharing-economy companies.58 More recently, Airbnb started to change 
its philosophy.59 The company worked with San Francisco city officials 
to draft new legislation and agreed to collect room-taxes.60 In the case 
 56. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 218-14 (2014), available at http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/up 
loadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinances14/o0218-14.pdf (amending regulation of short-term residential 
rentals and establishing fee); Joshua Sabatini, Chiu Introduces Legislation Seeking to Restrict Use 
of Short-Term Housing Rental Services Such as Airbnb, S.F. EXAMINER POLITICS BLOG (Apr. 16, 
2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/PoliticsBlog/archives/2014/04/16/chiu-in 
troduces-legislation-seeking-to-restrict-use-of-short-term-housing-rental-services-such-as-airbnb 
(describing rationales behind the proposal, such as preventing hotelization and collecting local 
taxes, and noting some of the proposed regulations); Joshua Sabatini, Amid Protest, SF Mayor 
Signs Into Law Airbnb Legislation, S.F. EXAMINER (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com 
/sanfrancisco/amid-protest-sf-mayor-signs-into-law-airbnb-legislation/Content?oid=2910424. 
 57. Act of Sept. 17, 2014, [2014] Cal. Stat. ch. 389 (codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 
§§ 5430–43), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id= 
201320140AB2293; Jeremy B. White, Ride-Sharing Companies Agree to California Deal on 
Regulation, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 27, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/27 
/6658915/ride-sharing-companies.html (reporting that major ride-sharing companies had agreed 
to minimum-insurance legislation and had mostly debated over amount rather than the right to 
legislate, itself).  
 58. Verne Kopytoff, Airbnb’s Woes Show How Far the Sharing Economy Has Come, TIME 
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/07/airbnbs-woes-show-how-far-the-sharing-
economy-has-come/ (reporting on company’s official statement expressing willingness to submit 
to certain types of regulation, commenting that such cooperation may be in the long-term interests 
of the viability and business opportunities available to the company). 
 59. Notably, however, Airbnb’s initial steps toward compliance are occurring only after a 
near $10 billion valuation. Alex Konrad, Airbnb Cofounders to Become First Sharing Economy 
Billionaires as Company Nears $10 Billion Valuation, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2014, 6:39PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2014/03/20/airbnb-cofounders-are-billionaires/. 
 60. Kopytoff, supra note 58 (reporting on company’s official statement expressing 
willingness to submit to certain types of regulation, commenting that such cooperation may be in 
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of Airbnb, the change of policy came only as a result of significant 
prodding from local governments.61 And pushback from sharing-
economy proponents remains. For example, SPUR, a California-based 
urban think tank and planning organization, criticized inappropriate 
regulations and fear-mongering techniques employed by established 
companies for causing unnecessary delays to the development of the 
sharing economy.62 We provide an overview of how the battle has 
developed in some of the major areas of regulation below.  
A. Transportation 
It’s expensive to be a taxi driver. In Seattle, for example, a city-
mandated English-proficiency exam, a written test on knowledge of 
local geography, municipal regulations, and appropriate driver- 
conduct; liability insurance (which can average around $7,000 per-
year); annual criminal-background checks; a driving-record review; 
and a physical exam are required before a prospective driver can legally 
sit in the driver’s seat.63 Taxi laws cap the profits companies can make 
from their passengers in exchange for caps on the number of taxis and 
for-hire vehicles allowed in the area.64 It was not until March 2014, 
however, that Seattle passed regulations that revealed the power of 
entrenched industry: the regulations capped the number of cars that can 
be on the road for any ride-sharing company at 150, establishing quotas 
without setting public safety requirements, even though the latter were 
the ostensible reason for proponents’ outcry for regulation.65 Though it 
the long-term interests of the viability and business opportunities available to the company). 
 61. See, e.g., All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 35 (describing Airbnb’s scuffles 
with local city regulators in Amsterdam, San Francisco, and California prior to engaging with 
governments and hiring Yahoo’s head of government relations as their new head of public policy); 
Craig Karmin, Airbnb Finds Little Hospitality in New York Market, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579 
141790931429948. 
 62. Gabriel Metcalf & Jennifer Warburg, A Policy Agenda for the Sharing Economy, SPUR 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.spur.org/publications/article/2012-10-09/policy-agenda-sharing-
economy (identifying how peer-to-peer car sharing was held back for years because California 
insurance regulations did not allow it and emphasizing the challenges to car sharing and dynamic 
ride sharing due to the threats they pose to car and taxi companies).  
 63. Wogan, supra note 32.  
 64. Id. (describing Seattle’s policies to illustrate a cause of the tension between traditional 
businesses and the disruptive sharing-economy companies). 
 65. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124441 (Mar. 19, 2014); Ryan Lawler, Seattle Deals a 
Blow to Uber and Lyft by Limiting the Number of Ride-Sharing Drivers on the Road, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 17, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/17/seattle-hates-ride-sharing (de-
scribing how the Seattle City Council initially sided with the taxi interests, linking to a live blog 
covering the council’s hearing, and reporting on reactions from affected companies); Remove the 
Roadblocks, ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21601 
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was the first city to place operating caps on alternative for-hire services 
like Uber, Lyft and Sidecar, it quickly backtracked from its position by 
passing compromise regulations on July 2014 that lifted caps on ride-
sharing vehicles in exchange for higher insurance requirements and a 
concession to the taxi industry to issue more taxi licenses.66 
The D.C. City Council was considering similar restrictions, 
causing companies such as Uber to worry about its continued business 
in the nation’s capital, but the fight was settled (albeit temporarily) 
through an agreement in 2012 that codified the companies’ rights to 
operate.67 This foreshadowed likely future scuffles, such as whether 
these ridesharing companies, though technically allowed to exist by 
city law, would have to comply with D.C. Taxicab Commission 
regulations that effectively disqualified current users from participating 
in the ride services market in the city.68 Miami, Houston, Portland, 
Austin, and New Orleans have refused to allow companies like Uber 
and Lyft to operate.69 Minneapolis, St. Paul, Milwaukee, and Detroit 
have required the companies operate like taxicabs.70 Illustrating some 
the complicated dynamics of the regulatory process, in Chicago, Uber 
mobilized consumers in retaliation against what it deemed unfavorable 
city regulation while also attempting to directly recruit cabbies to 
reduce the cab companies’ power base.71  
257-too-many-obstacles-are-being-placed-path-people-renting-things-each-other-remove.  
 66. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124524 (July 15, 2014) (repealing Ordinance 124441 
and adding and amending various sections of SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6.310); 
Lynn Thompson, Seattle Approves New Regulations That Satisfy Ride-Share and Taxi Drivers, 
GOV’T TECH. (July 15, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/local/Seattle-Approves-New-Regula 
tions-That-Satisfy-Ride-share-and-Taxi-Drivers.html. 
 67. Public Vehicle-for-Hire Innovation Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Law No. 19-631, 
60 D.C. Reg. 1717–23 (2013) (adding provisions for “digital dispatch,” id. sec. 2(i)); Mike 
DeBonis, Uber Triumphant, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/mike-debonis/wp/2012/12/03/uber-triumphant (commenting on Uber’s efforts to lobby city 
council members and its success in obtaining laws permitting the operation of these ridesharing 
vehicles); Travis Kalanick, DC Council Clears Path for Uber’s Future, UBER BLOG (Dec. 4, 
2012), http://blog.uber.com/2012/12/04/dc-council-clears-path-for-ubers-future (lauding the 
passage of the city regulations as a way of ensuring Uber’s future legality and thanking the 
consumers who participated in the campaign to pressure city council). 
 68. See Mike DeBonis, Uber Wars Threaten to Reignite over New Regulations, WASH. 
POST (May 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/mike-debonis/wp/2013/05/17/uber 
-wars-threaten-to-reignite-over-new-regulations (reporting company reactions to Taxicab 
Commission regulations that require ride payments to be processed via payment service providers 
that are integrated to on-board meter systems of cars). 
 69. See Reid Wilson, Seattle Becomes First City to Cap Uber, Lyft Vehicles, WASH. POST 
(March 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/03/18/seattle-be 
comes-first-city-to-cap-uber-lyft-vehicles/. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ted Cox, Uber Rallies Voters Against Pro-Taxi Bill, Recruits Cabbies to Convert, 
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Nearly every week, the media reports on car-sharing companies 
strategizing to improve their market share and accommodate the variety 
of jurisdictions they operate in without provoking binding regulations. 
Despite the desires of these companies to fly under-the-radar, it has 
proven difficult to do so in light of how disruptive they can be to 
existing transportation economies. Ride-sharing services have sparked 
protests by taxi drivers. In turn, these protests have led cities to crack-
down on car-sharing companies, claiming the vehicles are unlicensed 
and illegally operating a “for-hire” service.72 Some protests 
orchestrated by the drivers of existing transportation companies, such 
as those in Paris, have turned violent.73 New York City has even set up 
sting operations to stop people from using the new car-sharing 
companies.74 One commentator has gone so far as to characterize these 
attempts at Luddite retrenchments.75 In Austin, Texas, the city council 
similarly refused to accommodate their unique characteristics and 
recommended that ride-sharing services using mobile technologies be 
“required to work within the current City Code.”76 German cities have 
attempted bans of ride sharing, resulting in at least one administrative 
court reviewing a challenge to the ban.77 
DNAINFO CHI. (Apr. 10, 2014, 4:48 PM), http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140410/west-loop 
/uber-rallies-voters-against-pro-taxi-bill-recruits-cabbies-convert (showing the consumer-
mobilizing tactics of Uber in retaliating against what it deemed unfavorable city regulation and 
its attempts to reduce the cab companies’ power base by recruiting cabbies away). 
 72. Brian X. Chen, A Feisty Start-Up is Met with Regulatory Snarl, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/technology/app-maker-uber-hits-regulatory 
-snarl.html (describing Uber’s track record in obtaining concessions or sparking ire in various 
cities with its operate-first, ask-permission-later approach and its staunch opposition to what it 
views as regulatory bodies captured by protectionist interests); Tod Newcombe, City Taxi Systems 
Struggle with Change, GOVERNING THE STATE AND LOCALITIES (July 31, 
2013), http://www.governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/gov-city-taxi-systems-struggle-with 
-change.html (describing perceptions of entrepreneurs who see the taxi monopolies and scarcity 
of new licenses as protectionist and outdated policy). 
 73. Carol Matlack, Paris Cabbies Slash Tires, Smash Windshields in Protest Against Uber, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles 
/2014-01-13/paris-cabbies-slash-tires-smash-windshields-in-protest-against-uber (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2014); see also Carol Matlack, Europe’s Cabbies, Fed Up With Uber, Plan a Day of 
Traffic Chaos, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 10, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/arti 
cles/2014-06-10/europes-cabbies-fed-up-with-uber-plan-a-day-of-traffic-chaos (reporting on 
tentative plans for cabbies to arrange a general protest against ridesharing companies in cities 
across Europe). 
 74. Newcombe, supra note 72. 
 75. Leonard, supra note 31 (critiquing attempts at outright bans as futile, though 
acknowledging that collective bargaining by riot was effective on occasion in history, and flagging 
a more dire problem that this new technology may result in race-to-the-bottom labor conditions 
for the individuals participating in the ridesharing economy over the long term). 
 76. Newcombe, supra note 72. 
 77. Karin Matussek, Uber Wins Court Ruling Stopping Hamburg From Service Ban, 
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Cities both in the United States and internationally have demon-
strated significant uncertainty and variability in regulating these new 
types of transportation companies. Los Angeles issued a cease-and-
desist order to Uber, Sidecar and Lyft.78 Philadelphia went so far as to 
impound a few ride-share vehicles for unlicensed operation.79 Officials 
at the San Francisco International Airport claim to have actually 
arrested drivers for ride sharing because they did not meet airport 
regulations for cabs or limousines.80 In mid-August 2013, the taxicab 
commission in Washington, D.C. adopted strict new-sedan regulations 
tailored to keep Uber and its ride-sharing competitors out of the local 
market.81 This prompted the Federal Trade Commission to weigh in via 
a letter addressed to the commission advising against its regulatory 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-08-27/uber-wins 
-court-ruling-stopping-german-city-from-enforcing-ban (reporting that Hamburg’s ban is under a 
review and the court has ruled in the interim that the city cannot enforce the ban while it is under 
review). 
 78. Brian Frank, LA Sides With Taxi Companies, Sends Cease-and-Desist Letters to 3 Ride-
Sharing Startups, 89.3 KPCC, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (June 24, 2013), http://www.scpr.org 
/news/2013/06/24/37904/la-sides-with-taxi-companies-sends-cease-and-desis/#doclink. 
 79. Brad Tuttle, Rideshare Battle Shifts to L.A.: City Tells Uber, Lyft, SideCar to Stop 
Picking Up Riders, TIME (June 27, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/06/27/rideshare-battle 
-shifts-to-l-a-city-tells-uber-lyft-sidecar-to-stop-picking-up-riders/ (reporting on city’s cease and 
desist letters issued to ride-sharing companies, allegedly for safety and lack of licensing reasons, 
and the pushback of companies who continued to operate, arguing that their drivers are not 
commercial-transportation providers who transport passengers for hire); Anna Almendrala, LA 
Cease-and-Desist Letter to Ride-Sharing Apps Highlights Legal Gray Area, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 25, 2013, 9:51 pm EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/la-cease-and-desist 
-ride-sharing_n_3498782.html (noting the jurisdictional tensions between the state-run Public 
Utilities Commission, which has acknowledged the legality of these companies, and city 
regulators); see also Jon Healey, State to L.A.: Hands off Uber, Lyft, Sidecar and InstantCab, L.A. 
TIMES (July 30, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/30/news/la-ol-uber-lyft-sidecar 
-california-public-utilities-commission-20130730 (reporting on the state Public Utilities 
Commission’s turf battle against cities’ attempts to extend their taxi regulation authority to these 
“transportation network companies,” arguing that these networks should be regulated by the state 
agency). 
 80. Marcus Wohlsen, Why the Sun is Setting on the Wild West of Ride-Sharing, WIRED 
(Aug. 2, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/08/airport-arrests-uber-lyfts (reporting on 
arrests and the San Francisco International Airport’s explanation that they believed that picking 
up passengers unlicensed would be unsafe); see also Tim Worstall, This is Why We Can’t Have 
Nice Things: Uber and Lyft Drivers Being Arrested, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013, 11:14 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/08/03/this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things-uber 
-and-lyft-drivers-being-arrested/ (editorializing on these arrests being protectionist by preventing 
delivery of old services in new ways). 
 81. Perry Stein, D.C. Cab Commission Says New Regulations Not About Uber, WASH. 
CITY PAPER (Aug. 21, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk 
/2013/08/21/d-c-cab-commission-says-new-regulations-not-about-uber/ (reporting on new regu-
lations from the D.C. Taxicab Commission, which, by defining “sedan” narrowly, thus 
categorizing Uber cars under cab regulation instead of luxury sedan-service regulation). 
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approach.82 In Dallas and D.C., undercover police have cited Uber 
drivers for violating City Code.83 In a tale of two cities, Lyft and Uber 
began operating only in the St. Paul half of the Twin Cities.84 
Minneapolis would not allow them to operate without registering as a 
taxi service. This split puts in stark contrast the range of policy 
decisions available to local governments deciding what and how to 
regulate.  
Cars are dangerous, and in the car-sharing economy, insurance is 
a recurrent concern for regulators and participants. By now, peer-to-
peer car-rental services regularly provide insurance as part of the deal. 
Even within this subtopic of regulation, the divergent policies of taxis 
and the self-regulation of car-sharing companies can be surprising. 
Grey areas exist regarding whether a car-owner’s insurer is liable in the 
event of an accident.85 The insurance requirements for taxis vary based 
on city and state: in New York City, taxis must carry 
$100,000/$300,000 of liability insurance,86 while in D.C., taxis must 
 82. FTC, STAFF COMMENTS BEFORE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TAXICAB COMMISSION 
CONCERNING PROPOSED RULEMAKINGS ON PASSENGER MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION 
SERVICES (June 7, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents 
/ftc-staff-comments-district-columbia-taxicab-commission-concerning-proposed-rulemakings 
-passenger/130612dctaxicab.pdf (expressing “concern[]” at rules that may “unnecessarily impede 
competition” and exhorting the commission to reconsider their regulatory framework in order to 
“allow new and innovative forms of competition to enter the marketplace unless regulation is 
necessary to achieve some countervailing pro-competitive or other benefit, such as protecting the 
public from significant harm”).  
 83. Martin De Caro, Uber and DC Taxicab Commission Battling Again, WUSA9  
(Sept. 4, 2014, 8:50 p.m. EDT), http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/traffic/2014/09/04/uber-dc 
-taxicab-commission-tickets/15092983/ (reporting that Uber drivers were ticketed for picking up 
passengers in what the commission believed to be “illegal hires”); Robert Wilonsky, Update: 
Rawlings to Lead Investigation Into Crafting of Uber Ordinance; Uber Dallas Manager Says, 
‘This Isn’t Over Yet,’ DALLAS NEWS: CITY HALL BLOG (Aug. 28, 2013, 8:56 AM), http://city 
hallblog.dallasnews.com/2013/08/live-blog-city-council-debates-proposed-ordinance-intended 
-to-park-app-ordered-car-service-uber.html/ (mentioning, as part of coverage on contentious last-
minute city council convening, that 31 Uber-certified drivers received 61 citations). 
 84. Car-Sharing App Raises City Ordinance Questions, Irks Taxi Drivers, CBS 
MINNESOTA (Aug. 31, 2013, 11:05 PM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2013/08/31/car-sharing 
-app-raises-city-ordinance-questions-irks-taxi-drivers/ (reporting that Minneapolis’s requirement 
that driving for fares requires a meter prevented ridesharing company Lyft from operating there, 
while remaining free to operate in St. Paul, and noting city councilmember’s willingness to create 
a separate category of regulation for share-vehicle companies in order to allow them to operate 
without changing existing taxi laws). 
 85. Ron Lieber, Fatal Collision Makes Car-Sharing Worries No Longer Theoretical, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/your-money/relayrides-acci 
dent-raises-questions-on-liabilities-of-car-sharing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that no 
matter how much coverage there is, there will be battles between whether the sharing company’s 
insurance pays or the individual sharer’s insurance pays, and who pays the excess beyond the 
covered liability). 
 86. Daniel M. Rothschild, Ridesharing, Insurance and Regulation, R STREET (Apr. 10, 
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carry only $25,000/$50,000 policies.87 In D.C.’s example, this amount 
is actually less than regular drivers in neighboring Maryland are 
required by law to carry.88 In contrast, ridesharing companies Lyft and 
Uber insure drivers with $1 million policies.89 Uber was the first to add 
coverage for accidents that might happen while a driver is in-between 
rides.90 Other companies have followed this lead.91 In an attempt to 
stave-off regulation, Lyft has publicized that it voluntarily self-
regulates liability and safety protections that exceed New York City’s 
requirements for its taxis and for-hire vehicles.92 
California moved beyond one-size-fits-all regulatory schemes and 
established comprehensive regulations for ride-sharing. After an 
attempt at blunt regulatory control through cease-and-desist letters, the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) altered its approach to 
evaluate a regulatory response capable of balancing the risks and 
benefits of ridesharing services.93 In late 2013, CPUC issued a decision 
2014), http://www.rstreet.org/2014/04/10/ridesharing-insurance-regulation/ (reporting on how 
various states’ insurance requirements compare with major ridesharing companies’ insurance 
coverage). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Ingrid Lunden, Following Lyft, Uber Offers Coverage to Its U.S. Drivers to Close the 
“Insurance Gap,” TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 14, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/14/following 
-lyft-uber-offers-insurance-gap-coverage/ (showing competitive reactions to fatal accident that 
prompted ridesharing companies to consider whether to cover gaps in insurance between lifts, 
including Uber’s race to preempt Lyft’s announcement to cover the insurance gap). 
 91. Ryan Lawler, On-Demand Ridesharing Startup Lyft Adds Insurance Between Rides, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/03/13/lyft-insurance-between-rides/ 
(reporting Lyft’s decision to cover the insurance gap between rides, but characterizing it as 
“additional protection” and stating its expectation that personal carriers will cover the time 
between rides); Insurance & Guarantee, SIDECAR, http://www.side.cr/policies/insurance/ (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2014) (stating Sidecar’s policy to insure at the $1 million coverage rate, which 
puts them on par with their competitors’ insurance offerings and in compliance with later 
California regulations). 
 92. Lyft Will Launch in Brooklyn & Queens, LYFT BLOG (July 8, 2014), http://blog.lyft 
.com/posts/2014/7/8/lyft-launches-in-new-yorks-outer-boroughs (displaying graphical checklist 
that compares Lyft side-by-side on safety protections against taxi cab companies, for-hire 
companies, and Craigslist). 
 93. Michael Cabanatuan, Putting Brakes on Ride-Sharing Apps, S.F. GATE (Feb. 2, 
2014, 9:21 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Putting-brakes-on-ride-sharing-apps-39 
27193.php (recalling the initial round of cease-and-desist letters in 2012 from CPUC and 
regulators’ concerns about unaccounted liabilities); see also Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, CPUC to Evaluate Ridesharing Services (Dec. 20, 2012), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov 
/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M039/K594/39594708.PDF (declaring that it will reconsider its 
original stance opposing ridesharing services and evaluate how to regulate them, with a period for 
public comment); see also Carrier Investigations, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/transportation/Passengers/CarrierInvestigations/ (last modified 
Dec. 17, 2014) (listing press releases documenting the development of the CPUC’s handling of 
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on the issue.94 CPUC’s decision required ride-sharing companies like 
Sidecar, Lyft, and Uber to undergo vehicle-safety checks and audits by 
state authorities.95 Other regulations include insurance requirements for 
ride-sharing companies in addition to regulations such as criminal-
background checks, driver-training programs, zero-tolerance for drugs 
and alcohol, and 19-point vehicle inspections.96 CPUC required $1 
million per incident insurance coverage for ride-sharing vehicles.97 In 
line with the CPUC’s regulation of the car-sharing companies, ride-
sharing companies created a Peer-to-Peer Rideshare Insurance 
Coalition.98 Most recently, California passed Assembly Bill 2293, 
which mandates “transportation network companies” or their 
participating drivers to carry certain thresholds of minimum 
insurance.99  
Two other states (Oregon and Washington) passed laws relating 
to car sharing. These states placed required that the car-sharing services 
and their insurers be liable for incidents during the rental period.100 
GEICO has further sought to clarify its policies and in 2012 rewrote 
them to withdraw accident coverage for cars that have been rented to 
others in states that permit it.101 How the regulations further unfold in 
California and other early-adopter states could determine how other 
cities and states will regulate the industry and whether cities that have 
pushed out ride sharing—including Philadelphia, New York, and 
Austin—will change their minds.102 
ride-sharing companies, from initial citations to evaluations to operating agreements to formalized 
rules). 
 94. Decision Establishing Rules and Regulations for Transportation Network Companies, 
Decision No. 13-09-045 (Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov 
/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K192/77192335.PDF; Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, Docket No. 12-12-011, CPUC Establishes Rules for Transportation Network 
Companies (Sept. 19, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077 
/K132/77132276.PDF (publicizing in a press release that new regulations require licensing, 
minimum liability-insurance thresholds, and other safety-related safeguards). 
 95. CPCU Decision, at 40. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. California Welcomes Insurance Coalition for Ride Sharing, Uber Joins In, GOV’T 
TECH. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/state/California-Welcomes-Insurance-Coalition 
-for-Ride-Sharing-Uber-Joins-In.html (reporting on establishment and official government 
recognition of Peers, a coalition of ride-sharing companies, insurance companies, and government 
regulators seeking to support the growth of peer-to-peer ridesharing). 
 99. Act of Sept. 17, 2014, [2014] Cal. Stat. ch. 389 (2014) (codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
CODE §§ 5430–43).  
 100. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 35. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Already some of the ice seems to be thawing between private companies and city 
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B. Housing 
California is at the forefront of progressive regulation of the 
house-sharing economy. In San Francisco, Airbnb’s birthplace, the 
president of the city council announced a new approach to regulating 
home-sharing companies with the primary goal of creating a legal basis 
for home-sharing companies that otherwise had placed hosts in 
violation of local laws.103 The legislation allows individuals to rent-out 
their primary residences as long as they live at the property at least 
three-quarters of the year (275 days).104 Anyone who lives in a building 
with two or more units and wants to list their place on a website will 
have to apply to be in the city’s registry of approved hosts;105 to remain 
in that database, the person must keep records showing that their 
property is insured for at least $500,000 and that they collected taxes 
from their guests,106 which go into city coffers just like hotel taxes do. 
And they will have to reapply, paying a $50 application fee, every two 
years.107 Landlords can object to a tenant’s short-term listings, and the 
city could prohibit listings that are currently in violation of city 
codes.108 Airbnb supported these efforts to codify home sharing in the 
city’s laws, and at one point offered to collect and remit San 
Francisco’s 14% hotel tax as a way of facilitating its users staying 
compliant,109 although the legislation places legal responsibility for this 
requirement on the host.110 
In contrast, the experience of home-sharing companies in New 
York has followed a much more challenging path where, as sharing-
regulators. In New York City, Lyft agreed to adhere to much stricter standards and a business 
model that looks much more like a traditional taxi service in exchange for the right to do business 
in the city. Julia Marsh & Rebecca Harshbarger, Ride-Sharing Service Lyft Gets Green Light in 
NYC, N.Y. POST (July 25, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/07/25/ride-sharing 
-service-lyft-gets-green-light-in-nyc/ (reporting that Lyft conceded with demands to comply with 
licensing and car color requirements and plans to take a more long-term approach to introduce its 
full business model, including submitting a pilot proposal for peer-to-peer ridesharing). 
 103. Katy Steinmetz, San Francisco Cracks Down on Airbnb ‘Abuses,’ TIME (Apr. 15, 
2014), http://time.com/63810/san-francisco-airbnb-crackdown/ (explaining Supervisor David 
Chiu’s proposal to carve out an exception that permits occasional rentals to help “struggling 
families”). 
 104. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1) (2014). 
 105. Id. § 41A.5(g)(3). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Steinmetz, supra note 103 (reporting Airbnb’s announcement, weeks before the bill 
was unveiled, that it would ask residents to add a 14% tax and that Airbnb would pay the amount 
to the city). 
 110. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41.A.5(g)(1)(C) (2014). 
 
09_ARTICLE_CANNON+CHUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2015  4:41 PM 
2015] NEW MODEL OF CO-REGULATION 51 
economy companies have grown, they have faced numerous regulatory 
obstacles. In May 2013, a New York administrative judge found one 
Airbnb host in violation of the city’s occupancy code and a 2010 state 
law that bans apartment rentals shorter than 30 days.111 The ruling 
seemed to outlaw Airbnb from operating in New York, but with limited 
enforcement, its actual impact has been unclear.112 The New York State 
Attorney General also subpoenaed Airbnb’s records to determine 
whether hosts have been paying their fair share of taxes.113 After initial 
resistance, Airbnb complied with requests and claimed that it has self-
monitored to block users abusing its platform to conduct illegal 
activities.114 It also indicated that it would seek a regulatory carve-out 
that would allow it to collect New York’s hotel taxes and permit their 
users to rent their space for short-term stays.115 
Elsewhere the sharing economy and facilitated-sublets as pro-
vided by Airbnb, Wimdu, 9Flats and HouseTrip have prompted 
regulatory responses from local governments around the world. Those 
regulations identified rising housing prices and shortages in the 
housing market as justification for significantly limiting sharing- 
economy opportunities for owners and residents.116 Berlin, Paris, and 
 111. See New York City vs. Airbnb, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/interactive 
/technology/nyc-airbnb/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) (reproducing May 2013 decision from City 
of New York Environmental Control Board noting tenant’s rental of condo via Airbnb, which 
ruled the rental illegal and a violation of the city’s occupancy code because it permitted “transient 
occupancy” in housing designated for permanent use). 
 112. See, e.g., Julia Marsh & Kevin Fasick, Judge Nixes Airbnb Subletter’s Eviction, N.Y. 
POST (June 18, 2014, 4:20 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/06/18/judge-nixes-illegal-airbnb-sub 
letters-eviction/ (noting that, although subletter violated the Multiple Dwelling Law and breached 
her contract with her landlord, she could not be evicted because it is a curable violation). 
 113. Kaja Whitehouse, Airbnb Aims to Start Taxing Renters by July 1, N.Y. POST (Apr. 14, 
2014, 5:46 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/04/14/airbnb-aims-to-start-taxing-renters-by-july-1/. 
 114. Letter from Eric T. Schneider, N.Y. Attn’y General, to Belinda Johnson, General 
Counsel, Airbnb Inc., Agreement Regarding Compliance with Subpoena (May 20, 2014), http:// 
www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_Airbnb_Letter_of_Agreement.pdf (memorializing agreement that 
Airbnb will turn over anonymized data set redacting user-specific data); Bruce Golding, Two-
Thirds of NYC’s Airbnb Rentals Are Illegal Sublets, N.Y. POST (Apr. 21, 2014, 3:25 AM), 
http://nypost.com/2014/04/21/two-thirds-of-citys-airbnb-rentals-are-illegal-apartments-state/. 
 115. Polly Mosendz, Face-Off: NYC Lawmakers Grill Airbnb on Illegal Hotels, NEWSWEEK 
(Jan. 21, 2015, 1:26 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/face-nyc-lawmakers-grill-air 
bnb-illegal-hotels-301060 (describing ongoing lobbying efforts); Whitehouse, supra note 113 
(noting Airbnb’s incentives to settle ambiguities about illegality in anticipation of its going public 
and the hotel industry’s opposition that, tax-compliant or not, the activity should be deemed 
inherently illegal). 
 116. Ben Woods, Is the Clock Ticking for the Sharing Economy?, NEXT WEB BLOG 
(Nov. 23, 2013, 3:38 PM), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2013/11/23/clock-ticking-sharing 
-economy/#!sqj1J (reporting Berlin regulators’ rationales for attempting to limit holiday rentals 
on grounds of maintaining affordable housing prices, but characterizing these rentals as a drop in 
the housing market bucket). 
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several Spanish regions are developing regulatory systems of 
control.117 In contrast, adopting a co-regulatory approach, Amsterdam 
has appointed a social travel specialist to work with rental platforms.118 
It remains to be seen whether Airbnb has unlocked new economic 
value by bringing underutilized housing to market on a global basis and 
boosting tourism versus simply detracting from existing hotel stock. In 
an early 2014 round of fundraising, the company was valued at more 
than $10 billion.119 Cities with a housing shortage and requiring a 
transient occupancy tax for hotel and hotel-like rentals want a cut of 
that money, claiming that such house-sharing economies are 
flourishing at the expense of city planning, residents who depend on 
lower-cost housing, and traditional revenue streams that help offset the 
costs of hotel-like activity.120 The hotel market in general has not seen 
a significant downtrend, although the effects are measurable.121 Recent 
release of San Francisco data revealed that Airbnb had listed over 4,500 
properties, with about 6% of listings suggesting frequent rentals.122 The 
data does not clearly capture the kind of splash-over effects the rentals 
have had on the surrounding long-term housing market, however. 
 117. Id. (surveying attempts to regulate in Berlin, Paris, and four regions in Spain and noting 
the different regulations favored based on the traditional strength of the local hotel industry or the 
players in the local economy). 
 118. Harrison Weber, After a Rough Few Months, Airbnb Receives Amsterdam’s Blessing. 
Will Other Cities Follow?, NEXT WEB BLOG (June 7, 2013, 5:41 PM), http:// 
thenextweb.com/eu/2013/06/07/four-months-after-its-hunt-for-illegal-hotels-amsterdam-lightens 
-restrictions-on-airbnb-rentals/ (tracing evolution of Amsterdam’s stance toward home sharing, 
going from treating them as illegal to treating them as permissible with permits to even welcoming 
them, subject to limitations—whether the hosts live in the rented residence, whether the renting 
will cause a nuisance, and other safety-related concerns); David Hantman, Good News from 
Amsterdam, AIRBNB (June 10, 2013), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/good-news 
-from-amsterdam/ (lauding as progressive Amsterdam’s recognition of the legality of these short-
term rentals and expressing confidence that other cities that also conduct their own independent 
study will find these policies ultimately beneficial to the city).  
 119. Sydney Ember, Airbnb’s Huge Valuation, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (April 21, 2014, 
7:58 AM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/morning-agenda-airbnbs-10-billion 
-valuation/ (marveling, as a point of comparison, that the $10 billion valuation would place Airbnb 
at a higher value than established hotel chains such as Hyatt). 
 120. Steinmetz, supra note 103 (explaining the rationale why cities tax hotels—to help 
support the extra strain on city services from out-of-town visitors—and that short-term renters 
may be expected to collect the same tax because the same rationale applies to their visitors). 
 121. GEORGIOS ZERVAS, DAVIDE PROSERPIO & JOHN W. BYERS, THE RISE OF THE SHARING 
ECONOMY: ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF AIRBNB ON THE HOTEL INDUSTRY 17–18 (Bos. 
University School of Management, Research Paper Series No. 2013-16, Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://people.bu.edu/zg/publications/airbnb.pdf (publishing empirical data suggesting that, for 
average economy hotel, expected yearly revenue gain from eliminating Airbnb entire-apartment 
rentals would be around $56,000 and gain from limiting renters to a single property would be 
about $11,000). 
 122. Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact on S.F., supra note 29. 
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C. Moving Forward 
Sharing economy companies often violate existing laws and 
policies. Understandably governments are worried about consumer 
safety and diminishing tax revenue. Although PEERS, the sharing 
economy’s nascent association and lobbying arm, was formed to 
facilitate interaction with regulators, it has yet to achieve significant 
success in this regard.123 As discussed above, the regulatory response 
to sharing-economy firms has been inconsistent across the range of 
jurisdictions involved.124 Sharing-economy companies have largely left 
it to their users to navigate whether and how to pay taxes or what sort 
of risks to undertake. The complexity of the tax implications may lead 
users faced with managing these requirements to improperly report or 
underreport taxable income.125 While support services for facilitating 
tax answers are developing, such as the new 1099.is, which is designed 
to help people figure out their tax obligations in freelance and sharing 
economies, companies have varying attitudes with regard to how much 
burden they are comfortable putting on goods and service providers.126 
Part III proposes how to select a co-regulatory approach that picks 
feasible battles and suits the unique attributes of the market being 
regulated. 
 123. See Adrian Glick Kudler, Airbnb-Affiliated Lobbying Group Defeats Venice’s Attempt 
to Regulate Vacation Rentals in Los Angeles, CURBED L.A. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://la.curbed 
.com/archives/2013/11/airbnbaffiliated_lobbying_group_defeats_venices_attempt_to_regulate_
vacation_rentals_in_los_angeles.php (reporting that Peers was able to block an attempt in Venice, 
California to regulate short-term vacation rentals); Action Alert! Protect Ridesharing in 
California!, PEERS BLOG (Aug. 20, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://blog.peers.org/post/95329448124 
/action-alert-protect-ridesharing-in-california (calling members to mobilize to protest against 
California ridesharing legislation, which later passed with compromise agreements of its member 
companies).  
 124. See, e.g., Karla Zabludovsky, NYC is Battling Airbnb, BUT the Home-Sharing Firm 
Got a Green Light in Amsterdam, NEWSWEEK (May 1, 2014, 6:04 AM), http://www.newsweek 
.com/nyc-battling-airbnb-home-sharing-firm-got-green-light-amsterdam-249256 (summarizing 
various reactions to Airbnb-type home rentals across multiple cities in the world). 
 125. Sara Horowitz, How Do You Pay Taxes in the Sharing Economy? A Live Q&A, 
FREELANCERS UNION BLOG (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.freelancersunion.org/blog/2014/03/12 
/peers-freelancersunion-sharing-taxes/ (providing transcript of Q&A session sponsored by Peers 
fielding questions from sharing entrepreneurs about filing their taxes); Nancy Scola, Don’t Worry, 
the ‘Sharing Economy’ Even Confuses CPAs, NEXT CITY (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/dont-worry-the-sharing-economy-even-confuses-cpas (noting that, 
because of diversity of sharing economy business models, there is no one clear answer to how one 
files taxes—the answer depending on subtle distinctions such as whether the good or service is in 
exchange for money or whether the money is used to raise funds to generate a product or pay for 
a service). 
 126. 1099.IS, http://1099.is/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) (providing a question-and-answer 
website for those earning income through online entrepreneurism). 
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III. SELECTING A MODEL OF REGULATION THAT FITS SHARING 
ECONOMIES 
Determining how to regulate is a challenging first step when 
governmental actors are confronted with new commercial activity. 
Several years into the evolution of the technology-enabled sharing 
economy, government entities are still struggling with effective 
approaches for its regulation. Previous commentary identifies that 
agencies have a number of choices on how to proceed: inaction, 
rulemaking, negotiation, and litigation.127 If markets delivered all 
desired outcomes and consumers are protected from harm, then 
inaction may be appropriate. As explained in section I.B, however, 
market pathologies and gaps between incentives and needed 
protections make inaction an unattractive option for governments 
seeking to encourage healthy development of this new economy.128 
Litigation comes as a last resort, given the strain it places on an 
agency’s resources and the risk of chilling industry innovation and 
economic productivity. Negotiation may naturally occur as a part of the 
rulemaking process or prior to litigation when attempting to bridge the 
gap between industry and agency perspectives. 
A. The Need for Balanced, Negotiated Co-Regulation 
Academics have argued that there are no pure modes of self-
regulation or command-and-control regulation and that in reality 
different regulatory regimes offer varying roles for public and private 
actors.129 Negotiated co-regulation involves some mix of shared 
responsibility between government and industry entities, with different 
allocations of responsibility for setting goals, formulating standards 
and rules, and enforcement.130 On one extreme of formality, lawmakers 
can provide an explicit legal grant of authority to a self-regulatory 
organization, subject to the government’s oversight. In securities law, 
 127. Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandel & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 185–210 (2005) (reviewing the risks, benefits, and safeguards against 
common pitfalls for the four possible responses of government). 
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 21–36.  
 129. See, e.g., Tony Prosser, Self-Regulation, Co-Regulation and the Audio-Visual Media 
Services Directive, 31 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 99, 106 (2008) (characterizing the space between 
command-and-control self-regulation and pure-industry regulation as a continuum and noting that 
sectors can differ, based on the unique attributes of the market, in the exact shape of the co-
regulation). 
 130. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
547–549 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role] (exhorting readers not to assume a “center 
of decision making” and proposing “‘aggregate’ accountability” instead where private and public 
entities harness one another’s capacities). 
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for example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
regulates securities transactions subject to the oversight of the 
Securities Exchange Commission.131 On the other extreme, the 
government might refrain from issuing specific rules or mandating a 
course of action, instead negotiating voluntary commitments from key-
industry leaders to address certain problems or engage in certain 
activities. For example, federal and state law-enforcement authorities 
have cooperated with high-profile technology companies to develop 
technological tools that obtain useful data for unearthing online human 
trafficking.132 
In between these two poles of formal organizational oversight and 
informal voluntary cooperation lies a gradient of power-sharing 
possibilities. Government and industry may perform distinct roles. For 
example, a government agency may devise goals and desired outcomes, 
but leave the industry with the task of implementing particular 
solutions to achieve those outcomes and industry standards.133 Or the 
government entity may devise rules specific to the point of defining 
what technologies companies must use and in what manner, with 
industry representatives limited to consultation and comment.134 Or 
government and industry could collaborate throughout each step of 
governance and perform every task with the other’s input. For example, 
 131. See About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited May 22, 
2014). 
 132. CAL. OFFICE OF THE ATTN’Y GENERAL, THE STATE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN 
CALIFORNIA 65–66, 82, 88 (2012) (noting that companies such as Microsoft and Yahoo, in 
partnership with federal and state law enforcement agencies, have voluntarily offered services to 
help track down trafficked victims, including trigger responses in search engines when certain 
keywords are entered and photo-matching technology available for law enforcement). Privacy 
self-regulation often takes this form. See generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory 
Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 355 (2010). 
 133. See, e.g., Heather Jarvis & Wei Xu, Comparative Analysis of Air Pollution Trading in 
the United States and China, 36 ENVTL. L. REV. 10234, 10238 (2006) (contrasting United States’ 
“cap-and-trade” pollution regulation against a command-and-control environmental regulatory 
approach, noting that the former looks at overall pollution reduction goals for a given area, rather 
than control over the individual polluter’s behavior, such that the polluter is given some freedom 
to devise its own ways of meeting pollution reduction goals and even selling off its unused 
pollution allotment in the market). 
 134. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient? 
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for 
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 890–891 (1999) (challenging the commonly 
held view that market-enabling loose regulation achieves outcomes more efficiently than 
command-and-control regulation, noting that empirical success often depends on budget and legal 
constraints); see also id. at 920 (noting that command-and-control regulation, such as defining 
precisely what technological installations to mandate, made sense during an era where outcome-
oriented measurement of overall air-pollution reduction and continuous monitoring would have 
been infeasible). 
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a governmental entity and an industry trade association might negotiate 
the proper regulatory goals, collaborate on the drafting of standards, 
and work cooperatively to enforce the standards against specific firms 
that violate them. Scholars refer to this type of co-regulation as 
“collaborative governance” or “contractual regulation.”135  
Co-regulation is by no means a new mode of governance, but it is 
being increasingly utilized as an important instrument for achieving 
regulatory objectives.136 It is not uncommon for administrative agen-
cies to engage in negotiated rulemaking or to bring agency 
representatives and stakeholders together to approve consensus-based 
rules.137 Various levels of co-regulation have been used in a wide range 
of sectors, such as banking, securities,138 insurance,139 environmental 
protection,140 and technical standardization. For example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) sometimes negotiates 
compliance agreements that fit the circumstances of a firm or site 
location.141 Another common co-regulation strategy involves drawing 
upon existing industry guidelines as a common starting point for 
agencies seeking to develop safety or product standards.142 The 
 135. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 21–33 (1997) (“co-regulation”); see Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of 
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 68–80 (2001) (collaborative governance 
using the terms “micro contracts” and “macro contracts”). 
 136. LEADING ISSUES IN COMPETITION, REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 159–60, 207–08 
(Paul Cook, Colin B. Kirkpatrick, Martin Minogue, & David Parker eds., 2004); Colin Scott, 
Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance, 29 J. 
L. AND SOC’Y 56, 57, 59–67, 75–76 (2002). 
 137. See Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, supra note 135; 
Freeman, Private Role, supra note 130, at 654–55; Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The Future of 
Governance, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 411, 423 (2009). 
 138. Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How 
Governments Can Draw on Price Governance for Public Purpose, in NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON REGULATIONS 127, 143–45 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009), http://www.tobin 
project.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/New_Perspectives_Ch6_Balleisen_Eisner.pdf. 
 139. See Stephen C. Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of 
Market Manipulation, 38 J. L. & ECON. 141 passim (1995) (for applications in the banking, stock 
exchange, and insurance sectors). 
 140. For examples from the field of environmental protection, see, e.g., Eric Hysing, From 
Government to Governance? A Comparison of Environmental Governing in Swedish Forestry 
and Transport, 22 GOVERNANCE 647, 658–61 (2009); VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 4, 9, 31–41, 
107–23 (2001); Madhu Khanna, Non-Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection, 15 J. 
ECON. SURV. 291, 293–307 (2001).  
 141. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 130, at 657–64; see also Stewart, supra note 
135. 
 142. Freeman, Private Role, supra note 130, at 638–40. For example, Section 551 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(b)(1)(w)(1), 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006)), gives the FCC authority to promulgate ratings for violent, 
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California Occupational Health and Safety Administration, for 
example, worked with management and labor union to develop con-
struction safety standards.143 
The application of co-regulatory approaches to the sharing 
economy would only be an extension of its increasing application to 
Internet-based services. From consumer protection to the promotion of 
effective competition, a variety of regulatory goals are being pursued 
through co-regulation.144 The desire for a co-regulatory approach in 
shared-economies has become increasingly apparent, in light of the 
development of PEERS and similar organizations for lobbying and 
targeted advocacy.145 More targeted sub-segments within the sharing 
economy, such as the Carsharing Association,146 also have lobbyists. 
While there are extreme positions on the need for regulation—from an 
insistence that no regulation is necessary or appropriate for the sharing 
economy147 to a desire to regulate in an identical manner to the existing 
industries that it displaces148—regulators and firms are increasingly 
coming to agree that that they have a mutual interest in promoting 
innovation while ensuring consumer protection. 
Finding the right balance of regulatory intervention requires 
appreciating the risks of erring too far on either direction. Firms left 
unchecked, so the argument goes, will put their own profits ahead of 
the public interest, and self-regulatory standards will inevitably prove 
too lenient.149 Consumers, in turn, will not always vote with their feet 
because many of the sharing economies function as networked indus-
tries, where moving from one service provider to another requires 
sexual, or other material that parents may find objectionable for their children to watch. But it first 
offers the broadcasting and movie industries a chance to develop “voluntary standards.” 
Id. § 551(e)(1)(A). If the FCC finds these standards to be acceptable, it is to use them instead of 
developing its own. Id. 
 143. See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 130, at 651–53. 
 144. Florian Saurwein, Regulatory Choice for Alternative Modes of Regulation: How 
Context Matters, 33 L. & POL’Y 334, 337–41 (2011). 
 145. See, e.g., Start and Win Campaigns for the Sharing Economy, PEERS, 
https://campaigns.peers.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 146. CARSHARING ASSOC., http://carsharing.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014) (The chal-
lenges of forming industry groups is demonstrated by the limited membership of CSA, which does 
not include the major car-sharing companies such as zipcar, relay rides, or others). 
 147. Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing 
Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/10/from-air 
bnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/. 
 148. Avi Asher-Schapiro, Against Sharing, JACOBIN (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.jacobin 
mag.com/2014/09/against-sharing/ (noting favorably, in leftist magazine, the taxi unions and 
Teamsters’ particularly vocal opposition to ride sharing). 
 149. Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 138, at 145. 
 
09_ARTICLE_CANNON+CHUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2015  4:41 PM 
58 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
forfeiting a personal investment into building a reputation in a 
particular community, moving to another service provider with fewer 
participants, and losing any nontransferable personal data that the 
initial service provider could use to cater to user-specific preferences 
or needs.150 Businesses thrive on predictable regulatory environments, 
and some level of self-imposed limitations and cooperation with the 
government is necessary in order to build stability so that funders and 
market participants will invest in the market activity and have some 
assurance that the business will remain legally and economically 
viable.151 Moreover, government involvement has the potential to 
increase transparency. Because the industry has no requirement to 
report back to the public on all feedback received, the public may not 
receive positive reinforcement that rewards providing feedback or 
advocating for change by working through industry channels.152 
Without opportunities to provide input, the public is dis-incentivized, 
even where an awareness of issues exists, to expend significant efforts 
in mobilizing to provide feedback to industries.153 Finally, industry 
representatives, who do not hold governmental authority to fine or 
otherwise penalize scofflaws, may not possess sufficient power or 
incentives to enforce industry standards against their peers. A 
 150. See Daniel H. Kahn, Social Intermediaries: Creating a More Responsible Web 
Through Portable Identity, Cross-Web Reputation, and Code-Backed Norms, 11 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 176, 182–186 (2010) (identifying the problem of scattered identities across the 
Internet, where the hard-built reputation in one subcommunity is not transferable to another); 
cf. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Cyber Law: Norms, Property Rights, 
Contracting, Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Without the State, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 269, 
282–284 (2005) (documenting the emergence of reputation maintenance and dispute resolution 
because of the high stakes that come within managing online reputations and their significant 
effect on the ability to transact). 
 151. AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6–9 
(1994) (introducing the theory explaining how companies seeking to invest deal with uncertainty 
of reward, noting that irreversible bad investments can occur as a result of unanticipated-
government regulation as well, and describing a model where such uncertainty results in a higher-
cost threshold for investors to keep that option open); see Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New 
Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 109–113 (2013) (observing, in another technology-heavy 
context, that legal uncertainty deters development of new business models or investment into 
potentially lucrative and helpful ideas); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and 
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 279–280 (1986) (noting how legal 
uncertainty creates under- and over-compliance incentives, resulting in externalities). 
 152. Anya Kamenetz, Is Peers the Sharing Economy’s Future or Just a Great Silicon Valley 
PR Stunt?, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 9, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3022 
974/tech-forecast/is-peers-the-sharing-economys-future-or-just-a-great-silicon-valley-pr-stunt 
(observing the tension in maintaining independence and credibility for a nonprofit coalition where 
funding and most influential members are for-profit businesses). 
 153. CARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER KILMARTIN, & EVAN MENDELSON, TRANSPARENCY 
AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS v–vii, 18–21 (2008), http://www. 
hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/transparencyReport.pdf. 
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legitimate regulatory threat acts as a vital factor for ensuring industry 
coordination and compliance.154 Ultimately a company is legally 
accountable to its shareholders rather than the public, and the profit 
motive may not always naturally align with the incentive to improve 
the industry as a whole by correcting competitors’ policies.155 
On the other side of the equation, government stands to benefit 
from industry buy-in, as improved government-industry relations 
builds groundwork for future cooperation.156 The industry has unique 
knowledge of its own processes and business strategies.157 The more 
cost-effective and functional standards, paving the way for policies 
with greater effectiveness and political practicality.158 Collaboration 
also fosters accountability, allowing for shared responsibility in 
pursuing regulatory goals.159 Furthermore, though hard to quantify, 
some believe that collaborative regulation will encourage firms to share 
regulatory responsibilities more freely and to adhere to them more 
willingly than if they were subject to a government-driven process.160 
But that is assuming that co-regulation takes on the best of both 
worlds—industry expertise with government accountability and 
muscle. What happens when co-regulation brings out the worst of each 
actor? Critics claim that co-regulation leads to compromise and, 
ultimately, weaker standards.161 Because collaborative discussions 
often take place at least partially in non-public contexts, agency 
“capture” lurks as a possibility.162 Co-regulation may occur between 
private talks and insular industry meetings, coming at the cost of public 
 154. For example, the threat of regulation resulted in major compromises to Lyft’s peer-to-
peer business model in New York City to catch up to Uber’s presence in that market. Matt 
Flegenheimer, Car-Hailing Service, Lyft, Reaches Deal to Operate in New York City, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/nyregion/lyft-reaches-deal-to-op 
erate-car-hailing-service-in-new-york.html; Emily Caruthers, Lyft’s Sacrifice For the Sake of Its 
NYC Launch, CNBC (July 29, 2014, 2:51 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101876728. 
 155. See Caruthers, supra note 154. 
 156. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 135, at 22–24. 
 157. Cameron Holley, Facilitating Monitoring, Subverting Self-Interest and Limiting 
Discretion: Learning from “New” Forms of Accountability in Practice, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
127, 167 (2010) (discussing how firms consciously or unconsciously may exploit their own 
knowledge advantage). 
 158. Id. at 168–70; see also Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 135, at 26. 
 159. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 135, at 82. 
 160. Id. at 22–24. 
 161. Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
291, 318 (2014). 
 162. Patricia A. McCoy, Public Engagement in Rulemaking: The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s New Approach, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 20 (2012). 
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input.163 If enforcement is left to industry self-policing or voluntary 
compliance, noncompliant firms may seek to free ride.164 Established 
firms could also gain an unfair advantage if they help entrench 
standards that discriminate against new entrants.165 These concerns 
over co-regulation identify the risks that greater roles for industry in 
the regulatory process will not necessarily yield desirable social 
outcomes.166 
Two examples are of particular note. Leading up to the 2009 
financial crisis, significant leverage of capital was common and both 
bank executives and regulators at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission were largely oblivious to the risks, at least in part due to 
a new initiative, the Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) 
Program.167 The CSE delegated the performance of regulatory risk 
assessments to the banks themselves, who conducted these assessments 
with sophisticated internal computer models and limited transparency. 
Similarly, during the Bush Administration, after significant pushback 
from electric utilities reliant on coal power plants, the EPA even shied 
away from issuing recommendations for state regulation of coal ash.168 
Instead, it deferred to an organization of utilities that produce electricity 
from coal, Utilities Solid Wastes Activity Group (USWAG), which had 
devised an “Action Plan” to identify proper disposal of coal ash.169 
Utilities could voluntarily adopt the USWAG plan, which avoided any 
requirement for expensive precautions such as linings for storage 
basins and reinforced dams. These approaches were insufficient and the 
2008 Kingston coal ash spill released 1.1 billion gallons of coal ash 
slurry and is the largest fly ash release in United States history.170 Co-
regulation is no panacea and requires goal-oriented collaboration and 
co-regulatory checks and balances. 
Determining what is effective and appropriate regulation requires 
regulatory design that anticipates the potential downfalls of co-
regulation. Regulators must purposefully engineer the regulatory 
mechanisms to guard against the lack of transparency and account-
ability that often accompanies a shift from public deliberation to 
 163. Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules 
Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029, 1046 (2013). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 138, at 127–29. 
 168. Id. at 128. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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industry collaboration. In particular, regulators must avoid, the mis-
aligned incentives that impede vigorous public advocacy, and find 
ways to corral nonparticipating industry members or free riders into the 
system. 
B. Finding a Good Fit: Co-Regulation that Leverages the 
Attributes of the Shared Economy Landscape 
Co-regulation comes at the cost of social and institutional re-
sources.171 In order to maximize limited resources, co-regulators must 
pick their battles—to decide where they can be the most effective with 
the least regulatory strain. This requires an evaluation of where the 
regulatory actors have a unique competence for addressing a certain 
need that the shared economy is ill-equipped to handle on its own, 
identifying the areas where targeted intervention may have the most 
impact. In section I.B, we have already identified four areas—
consumer protection and liability, labor laws, speech regulation, and 
local tax revenue interests—where regulatory intervention seems most 
necessary. The next step is to consider the natural incentives and 
disincentives for private action to identify areas where intervention 
may have the greatest impact. 
Florian Saurwein, in the article Regulatory Choice for Alternative 
Modes of Regulation: How Context Matters, proposes eleven 
contextual factors that regulators should consider when selecting the 
type of coordination and government intervention necessary.172 We 
apply this analysis to the sharing economy below. 
1. Economic Benefits for the Industry 
Where the benefits of self-regulation outweigh its costs, self-
regulation creates win-win outcomes for the industry, and self-regu-
lation will arise on its own. Where transaction costs to coordination are 
high, however, these prohibitive costs may prevent companies from 
coming together and coordinating their efforts on activities that may 
otherwise help consumers in that industry. For example, Saurwein 
discusses standardization in the computer industry as one example of 
how creating a standard benefited the industry and helped companies 
 171. See Lesley K. McAllister, Dimensions of Enforcement Style: Factoring in Regulatory 
Capacity and Autonomy, 32 LAW & POL’Y 61, 65 (2010) (noting that maintaining regulation 
reflects a resource cost that is a function of an entity’s regulatory capacity which requires “a 
certain level of staff and budget resources” and “the resources to complete the basic tasks of rule 
enforcement”). 
 172. Saurwein, supra note 144, at 341. 
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capitalize on the expected growth of consumer computer use.173 
Furthermore, the market demand for coordinated information for 
consumers may spur the industry to create information delivery that 
helps consumers match more accurately with the goods and services 
they desire, such as the movie and game industries creating self-
enforced ratings systems to help consumers select movies and games 
with content appropriate for them or their children.174 As academics 
have noted, the creation of such environmental or social standards can 
have direct benefits in improving the economic performance of an 
industry.175 Standardization and its ensuing network effects,176 and the 
rapid growth of the computer industry, are testament to the economic 
incentives that may powerfully drive the industry to self-regulate or to 
cooperate in coordinating a regulatory response.177 
Digital sharing economies have built-in incentives to improve 
information delivery to participants and maintain certain standards of 
consumer protection, as they rely on trust and reliable-reputational 
information. The most successful business models, for example, 
Airbnb or RelayRides, use rating systems that allow for review of 
products over time. However, peer user systems do have notable 
deficiencies. For example, product reviews, such as found on 
Amazon.com reveal the ability of individuals to falsely inflate or 
deflate the aggregate rating of a product178 or otherwise obfuscate its 
actual value.179 Similarly, the New York Attorney General’s suit 
against companies falsifying Yelp reviews shows the lure of profit that 
 173. Id. at 342 (describing how self-interest in industries as diverse as the computer industry, 
the adult film industry, and the paper industry leads to voluntary standardization and compliance 
to industry baselines). 
 174. See, e.g., Anna Everett, P.C. Youth Violence: “What’s the Internet or Video Gaming 
Got to Do with It?,” 77 DENV. L. REV. 689, 695 (2000) (explaining that media networks 
voluntarily instituted a self-policing strategy in response to the threat of government regulation); 
cf. Video Game Rating Act of 1994, H.R. 3785, 103d Cong. (1994) (providing an example of the 
type of legislation that may have constrained the industry if it had not offered viable self-
regulation alternatives). 
 175. See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the 
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 102–110 (1995).  
 176. See, e.g., Bryant Cannon, A Plea for Efficiency: The Voluntary Environmental 
Obligations of International Corporations and the Benefits of Information Standardization, 
19 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 454, 482–83 (2012) (discussing processes and benefits of standardization). 
 177. Anil K. Gupta & Lawrence J. Lad, Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, 
Organizational, and Political Analysis, 8 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 416, 417–19 (1983). 
 178. See, e.g., Eric T. Anderson & Duncan I. Simester, Reviews Without a Purchase: Low 
Ratings, Loyal Customers, and Deception, 51 J. MARKETING RES. 249 (2014), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/simester/Public/Papers/Deceptive_Reviews.pdf. 
 179. See, e.g., Funniest Reviews, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?doc 
Id=1001250201 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
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comes with manipulating reputational standards.180 Although comfort 
with online commerce systems has steadily expanded,181 the addition 
of non-professional service or good-providers to the mix combined 
with market volatility make consumer evaluation more challenging. 
The specter of libel lawsuits and the industry’s desire to make these 
high-trust transactions appear low-risk may disincentivize users and 
companies from making bad reviews or publicizing all but the most 
dramatic and problematic experiences. In such instances where 
transaction costs have crept in and have made the sharing of 
information difficult among participants in the economy, government 
regulators can leverage industry’s mutual interest in establishing the 
trust of market participants and punishing risk-creating, undesirable 
behavior to advocate for higher levels of consumer protection.182 
Though some commentators have asserted that “contract law and 
the power of reputation should serve to protect participants to the same, 
if not a greater extent, than we see in standard market exchanges,”183 
this is not universally true of all aspects of a sharing-economy business. 
True, sharing systems succeed precisely because they depend on 
creating formats that lower consumer risk and therefore require less 
consumer protection. Where a sharing system has a robust platform for 
reporting bad behavior, reputation drives success and participants are 
therefore automatically motivated to police their own systems and to 
behave within the system’s norms. Nevertheless, where risk levels are 
high, feedback reliability and response times are low, and participants 
have ulterior motives, this may suggest that such reputational systems, 
even if sufficient for most transactions most of the time, contain gaps 
where there is a mismatch between the type of protection the market 
participants might want and the type of protection the market naturally 
provides. 
 180. Julie Bort, New York Attorney General Busts 19 Companies For Writing Fake Yelp 
Reviews, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 23, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/new-york 
-cracks-down-on-fake-yelp-reviews-2013-9 (describing a business model where businesses profit 
from offering to find people who have an established presence at Yelp to write positive reviews). 
 181. Compare Jonathan J. Rusch, Don’t Look Now, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 289, 307–08, 
311 (2000) (reporting, in an article written at the beginning of the last decade, that consumers who 
were already connected to the Internet have fostered an “extraordinary degree of faith and trust” 
in the Internet and that time spent online correlates with the trust they have in online interactions 
and data), with Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L. 
REV. 523, 541–42 (2001) (referring, in another article written near the beginning of the last 
decade, about consumers’ initial distrust of online transactions). 
 182. John Kuo, How Should Government Regulate The Sharing Economy?, NERDWALLET 
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/2013/government-regulate-sharing 
-economy. 
 183. Id. 
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For example, consider how risk plays into the decision to regulate. 
A particular market behavior requires little or no intervention if the 
consumer risk involved is low or if insurance may adequately cover the 
risk. For example, the purse-sharing economy of Bag Borrow or Steal 
involves the sharing of a relatively low-risk commodity—luxury purses 
that cost around a few hundred to rent by the month. If a consumer 
damages the purse, the insurance policy anticipates the risk. A credit 
check limits the pool of consumers to low-risk buyers and renters, and 
a credit card on record provides a financially viable answer to the 
human tendency to forget or to walk away from a commitment. Clearly, 
no purse-regulating task force is necessary, and the ordinary 
protections for dealing with bad business practices, online transactions 
gone awry, or careless customers are sufficient to address risk in ways 
that the market participants already understand well. Similarly, where 
an active community base quickly and responsively reports bad 
behaviors (and the risk of false positives is not high), government 
entities may decide that intervention is necessary only to the limited 
extent that they may wish to protect the underlying rules that enable 
such self-regulating mechanisms to flourish (e.g., safe harbors for gray 
areas in libel, protections against reputational abuse or unfair 
competition). Where participants are sufficiently incentivized by their 
desire for good reputation and the need for repeated future transactions 
to behave themselves, the need for regulation becomes less dire. 
Thus, for most instances most of the time, the businesses and the 
participants in the economy have natural economic incentives to share 
information accurately. The media may even keep the industry honest 
about dramatic, egregious failures of their system, such as when a 
Airbnb renter found the residence trashed by the guests or when an 
Uber driver killed a pedestrian while driving between lifts.184 Similarly, 
the desire to minimize the appearance of risk and to invite consumers 
to trust the sharing economy alternative to traditional ownership may 
naturally encourage companies to buy adequate liability insurance to 
cover frequently occurring harms. For example, ride-sharing 
companies may purchase a standardized car insurance plan for every 
driver for run-of-the-mill risks associated with driving, lending cars to 
others, and picking up passengers. Insurance companies, in turn, will 
demand that these ride-sharing companies enforce a certain baseline of 
 184. Dan Levine & Sarah McBride, Ride Service Uber Faces New Lawsuit After Fatal San 
Francisco Crash, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2014, 7:56pm EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014 
/01/28/us-uber-accident-lawsuit-idUSBREA0R02820140128; George Hobica, 10 Incredible 
Airbnb Horror Stories, FOX NEWS (May 8, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2014/05/08 
/10-incredible-airbnb-horror-stories/.  
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filters to ensure that participating drivers in their markets meet some 
threshold of safety, so that they can ascertain what kind of risks they 
are undertaking. 
It follows from this that intervention in the areas of consumer 
protection and speech regulation should be limited and targeted. For 
example, regulators may feel that there are certain levels of risk (not 
extremely dramatic, but still sufficiently serious for state oversight) 
where the incentives of the industry align with responding by censor-
ship rather than disciplining bad actors. For example, even if regulators 
trust that the reputation ratings system of a meal-sharing website will 
filter out hosts with a dramatic history of food poisoning or poor 
hospitality skills, they might also suspect that sites may generally have 
a positive censorship bias because new economies have an incentive to 
show their experiences as low-risk and to minimize bad experiences.185  
In contrast to consumer protection or speech regulation, the 
industry may have relatively weak incentives to advocate strongly for 
labor protections or tax regulations.186 Many market participants who 
offer services through sharing economy platforms do so because they 
are able to offer their services with low commitment or prerequisites.187 
Others may be freelancing because they depend on such alternate 
sources of work due to their inability to secure full-time employment 
or because of personal schedule requirements.188 Because of the 
freelance nature of their work, their dependence on the informal 
working relationships, or their inability to move across platforms 
because of their dependence on reputation built elsewhere, the market 
participants in these economies either have little incentive to advocate 
for their own rights and organize demands and little leverage to obtain 
changes in their favor. And as far as tax revenue is concerned, platform 
providers have shown little interest in contributing to government 
revenue except as a bargaining chip for obtaining legitimacy or the 
right to operate in a jurisdiction. In such areas where no industry 
consensus exists and little incentive exists to spur it to action, the 
 185. See Dara Kerr, Should Uber and Lyft Keep Passenger Ratings Secret?, CNET (Sept. 
25, 2014, 7:00 AM PDT), http://www.cnet.com/news/should-uber-and-lyft-keep-passenger-rat 
ings-secret/ (noting the disincentive to be harsh when both parties to the transaction can see one 
another’s ratings and small differences in rating can make the difference between successful or 
unsuccessful transactions). 
 186. Ozimek, supra note 54; Singer, supra note 30. 
 187. See Sarah Kessler, Pixel & Dimed, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3027355/pixel-and-dimed-on-not-getting-by-in-the-gig-economy 
(discussing minimal prerequisite requirements, low-mandatory commitment to a sharing platform, 
and challenges of scaling service or good provision by new market participants). 
 188. Singer, supra note 30. 
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government can play a role in convening stakeholders, balancing 
interests, and helping a company gain legitimacy for its position while 
exacting concessions that ensure a baseline of protection for consumers 
and the public at large. 
Intelligent co-regulatory design can take the natural landscape of 
economic incentives into account in two ways. Government may elect 
to pick their battles by covering ground that the industry would not 
cover on its own, focusing on labor or tax regulation and taking a light 
hand to most consumer protection or speech regulation matters. For 
example, the self-regulatory aspects embedded within certain sharing 
economy business models—from digital identity verification to 
reputation and credit scoring systems—may provide superior consumer 
protection as compared with existing regulatory modes for analogous 
goods or services. Government agencies may well decide to stay out of 
regulating such areas heavily. On the other hand, if a government entity 
does not have sufficient resources or political will to fight for a major 
reform, it may opt for targeted cooperation in areas of regulation where 
the industry already has significant economic incentive to self-
regulate—for example, by leveraging existing consumer unrest 
regarding greater insurance coverage to work out an agreement with 
key industry players for minimum insurance floors.189 Regardless of 
the co-regulatory design, an understanding of the underlying economic 
incentives is invaluable for sustained success.  
2. Reputational Sensitivity of the Industry 
Different industries may have different levels of public visibility 
and probability of detecting misconduct, which in turn implicate 
different levels of natural economic incentives to respond to negative 
complaints about the business. For example, the private military and 
security industry has a limited number of participants and its operations 
are nontransparent to members of the public, who are not consumers in 
that market. As a result, the industry has low incentives to improve the 
reputation of the industry itself, and the government may need to play 
more of a role in providing the “regulatory threat” that causes the 
industry to respond and to crowd the landscape with its own regulations 
and standards, leaving less room and incentive for the government to 
supply a credible competing regulatory scheme.190  
 189. Jeremy B. White, Ride-Sharing Companies Agree to California Deal on Regulation, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 27, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/27/6658915/ 
ride-sharing-companies.html.  
 190. Cf. Stephen Erfle et al., Regulation via Threats: Politics, Media Coverage, and Oil 
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However, sharing-economy industries, in particular, have high 
reputational sensitivity when compared with other industries,191 
because they have strong incentives to build the legitimacy for a new 
form of economic activity that requires consumers to adjust their trust 
thresholds and to transact with strangers in a way they are not used to 
doing alone.192 Organizations promoting the interests of established 
and trusted traditional businesses, such as taxi companies, are all too 
eager to push back on ride-sharing industry by pointing to unregulated 
risk and discouraging consumers who have yet to attempt crossing over 
to this new market.193 As a result, those who provide platforms for the 
sharing economy have a strong reputational stake in showing the safety 
and low-risk nature of the industry as a whole, not just their own brand 
of services. Quite often, a sharing economy platform provider must first 
evangelize on the concept of sharing itself before they will win any 
converts to their particular brand of sharing. Externally validated and 
broadly accepted demonstrations of high performance and consumer 
protection will better insulate the sharing economy as a group.194 This 
means that sharing economy platform providers may naturally have 
greater incentives to cooperate with competitors to create industry-
wide protocols and baselines than those in other industries. 
Pricing Decisions, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 48, 60–61 (1990) (intensity of public opinion demanding 
intervention, government’s capacity to react to pressure, and availability of external scapegoats 
affects the level of perceived threat and industry incentive to respond with action). 
 191. This is especially true given that, in peer-to-peer (P2P) contexts, businesses act as 
transactional intermediaries and depend on reputation to succeed. See Saurwein, supra note 144, 
at 343. 
 192. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 35 (quoting founder of Airbnb’s 
observation that this business model would not have been possible without the groundwork of 
sharing culture that occurred through social networks such as Facebook); RACHEL BOTSMAN & 
ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION xiii, 43 
(HarperBusiness, 2010) (surmising that generational differences may account for the differences 
in attitudes toward sharing); Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust 
Each Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the 
-share-economy/ (commenting on shift in consumer thinking and greater comfort levels with 
trusting strangers that made the sharing economy possible).  
 193. Lauren Frayer, Uber, Airbnb Under Attack in Spain as Old and New Economies Clash, 
NPR (July 29, 2014, 4:55 AM ET), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/07/29/3277 
96899/uber-airbnb-under-attack-in-spain-as-old-and-new-economy-clash; see also Neelie Kroes, 
My View on Today’s Taxi Protests and What it Means for the Sharing Economy, EUR. COMM’N 
(June 11, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/blog/my-view-todays-taxi 
-protests-and-what-it-means-sharing-economy (demonstrating that even officials of government 
super-entities such as the European Commission are watching carefully to see where sharing 
economies are failing to address the needs of the public and the collateral effects of disruption on 
social change). 
 194. Karsten Ronit & Volker Schneider, Global Governance Through Private 
Organizations, 12 GOVERNANCE 243, 260 n.7 (1999) (“[t]he translation of an external threat to 
internal pressures operates according to the logic of collective sanctions.”).  
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The network effects of a sharing economy also helps marginalize 
free-riders who try to benefit from the improved reputation derived 
from the coordinated efforts of the industry without themselves 
submitting to the industry’s self-regulated standards. Because sharing 
economies gain value as they gain a critical mass of participants, it 
functions as a networked industry that prospers with economies of scale 
and can usually sustain only a few large competitors.195 For example, a 
ride-sharing consumer or ride-provider may have some kind of ceiling 
in mind regarding the number of ride-sharing networks she is willing 
to join. By participating in the largest network, the user maximizes their 
selection and speed in encountering an acceptable transaction 
opportunity. Fly-by-night evaders who fall outside of these largest 
networks have little opportunity to build a network base to compete 
credibly with those who have already captured the dominant network 
in that sector in the sharing economy. In order to compete, they must 
differentiate their services (perhaps there will be a separate niche of 
ride-sharers for those who are looking for rides equipped with car-seats, 
rides that facilitate illegal activities, or rides with more stable prices 
during peak times). In other words, they are either forced to become 
marginal niche operators, cut profits, or, as they become legitimate and 
capture greater shares of the market, they are forced to cooperate with 
others as they come to share a large stake in the overall reputation of 
the industry. 
These characteristics suggest that co-regulatory design should 
take into account natural industry-wide incentives to boost reputation 
in certain areas of their business to identify potential areas for co-
operation. It also helps identify particular types of economic 
environments, where there are high barriers to entry and only a few key 
players and networks, that are particularly conducive to largely 
voluntary industry-wide co-regulation, with low risk of a critical mass 
of market players opting out. 
 195. Report on the Sharing Economy: Accessibility Based Business Models for Peer-to-Peer 
Markets 11 (Business Innovation Observatory, Eur. Comm’n, 2013) [hereinafter EU Sharing 
Economy Report], http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/business 
-innovation-observatory/files/case-studies/12-she-accessibility-based-business-models-for-peer-
to-peer-markets_en.pdf (describing how network effects limit the number of viable competitors 
in a given market, the benefits of economies of scale for early entrants, and the swift emergence 
of barriers that prevent late entry). As an analogy, consider Facebook’s prominence in the social 
networking world. Part of the appeal of Facebook is having all of one’s friends’ updates all in one 
place. Although one could imagine a social networking platform that provides better features or 
stronger privacy protections than Facebook, the nontransferability of users’ investment into the 
existing network prevents the creation of a large number of credible competitors in that particular 
niche of social networking. 
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3. Intervention Capacity of Governmental Actors 
Co-regulatory systems become more attractive and effective if 
there is a credible threat of government intervention or litigation—a 
stick-and-carrot strategy.196 Intervention capacity is higher if 
government possesses appropriate knowledge, resources, and instru-
ments to monitor, enforce, and impose sanctions.197 
The sharing economy’s characteristics—as a decentralized yet 
networked market dependent on trust—come with regulatory conse-
quences. There are some types of endeavors the government is not 
well-equipped to handle. Firsthand policing of the market is a low-
feasibility option. The peer-to-peer nature of the transactions means 
that going after individual actors will have little deterrence impact on 
the overall structure without a significant investment into law 
enforcement. Like peer-to-peer media sharing in the early-2000’s, the 
most effective regulatory approach required leveraging, rather than 
fighting against, the networked but decentralized nature of the 
market.198 Just as Netflix and iTunes were able to shift the market to 
legal activity in a way that law enforcement could not; by changing the 
concept of ownership, leveraging the network to add features such as 
recommendations, communities, compatibility with devices, and 
improving ease of use; working with the platforms that enable these 
peer-to-peer transactions together is the most efficient way to direct 
consumer behavior and push for industry-wide changes. For those 
networked markets where only a few key players exist, the movers and 
shakers are easy to identify, and the easiest way for government 
regulators to establish a new industry practice or standard may be to 
simply convene the key players and build voluntary consensus.199 
There are other areas in which the government has an advantage 
over their industry partners. The government can play a mediating and 
vision-setting role in bringing together competitors to discuss the 
 196. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 43–44 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). 
 197. Saurwein, supra note 144, at 344. 
 198. Press Release, The NPD Group: Music File Sharing Declined Significantly in 2012, 
NPD GROUP (Feb. 26, 2012), https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/news/press-releases/the 
-npd-group-music-file-sharing-declined-significantly-in-2012/; Victor Luckerson, Revenue Up, 
Piracy Down: Has the Music Industry Finally Turned a Corner?, TIME (Feb. 28, 2013), http:// 
business.time.com/2013/02/28/revenue-up-piracy-down-has-the-music-industry-finally-turned-a 
-corner/. 
 199. New markets can be rapidly consolidated and the acquisition by established players can 
simplify the regulatory process. For example, RelayRides received significant investment from 
GM in 2011. In 2012, Avis acquired Zipcar. See All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 35, 
at 14. 
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overall direction of the development of the industry and advocate for 
the interests of the public. Because the government holds the specter of 
prosecution and regulation, which may either make the shared 
economy’s business model illegal or cut into its profitability, it holds a 
powerful stick that can deter investors, hurt participant confidence 
regarding the legality and risk levels associated with the market, and 
favor incumbent traditional economic models over the new business 
models on which the shared economy depends. The government also 
has a distinct advantage in its ability to convene, to publicize, and to 
garner the public’s attention through its ready access to press attention. 
Moreover, there are subject areas that call for government-
facilitated regulation because market inefficiencies may prevent 
industry participants from adequately regulating themselves. As 
explained earlier, individual buyers and sellers may have insufficient 
incentive to self-regulate regarding consumer protections, liability 
allocation and insurance levels, labor protections, or to help local 
communities replace traditional tax and revenue streams. The precise 
contours of how to achieve these goals calls for industry consultation, 
since academics have established that government intervention 
capacity is lower where there is a high degree of technological 
complexity.200 Intervention capacity is further lowered where there is 
little leeway for regulatory action at the national level but a significant 
demand for cross-sector coordination that can cause disagreement 
among governmental and private actors.201 Given the technical and 
rapidly developing nature of these business models, effective co-
regulation will place the government in more of a general goal setting 
and monitoring role, rather than in micromanaging particular methods 
by which to obtain the desired outcomes. To the extent that the 
government recommends specifics, they should be tailored to the 
specific industry, informed by industry and consumer perspectives 
alike, and provide baseline protections against the extremes, 
consolidates public opinion, works with the industry on goal-setting, 
and injects public transparency by publicizing joint industry-
government planning—leaving flexibility for the industry to fill in 
specifics. 
Government entities can focus on the areas they perform best: 
placing pressure on industry to remain accountable to certain public 
 200. Adrienne Héritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl, The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of 
Governance: Sectoral Governance and Democratic Government, 28 J. OF PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–17 
(2008).  
 201. Saurwein, supra note 144, at 344. 
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goals, monitoring their progress by the market outcomes, and building 
transparency into the process by becoming a conduit for public input 
and a publicizer of co-regulation efforts.202 At the same time, 
government should intentionally refrain from areas where their insti-
tutional strengths are not a good fit. Shared economy firms, with their 
access to market data, algorithms for identifying manipulation or bad 
actors, and timely understanding of the evolution of their markets and 
target users, are in the best position to provide information to drive the 
shared decision-making between government policymakers and the 
industry.203 The industry is in a better position to collect data and 
explain how its solutions measure up to public goals. Government 
oversight can hold the industry accountable to public outcomes without 
straitjacketing the industry’s exploration of the means to achieve these 
outcomes, and, once a viable solution appears, promote the spread of 
consistent regulatory regimes across jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, governments may have to decide among themselves 
whether, jurisdictionally, they are the best actor to affect the reforms 
they seek. State and local levels of government are better suited to 
regulating these emerging markets. Because the sharing economy is an 
approach to business activity based on improved access to goods and 
services, not limited to any specific industry or particular localities, 
blanket legislation at the federal level will almost certainly be 
incongruous. The type of rules necessary to protect the public are more 
likely to be good- or service-specific, rather than common to all shared-
economy-type industries, and good-specific or service-specific 
regulation tends to depend on local conditions. Local governments may 
differ in the set of interest they are seeking to balance. For example, 
 202. See Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial 
Industry, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 665, 703 & n.128 (2010) (maintaining that no self-regulatory 
scheme can be truly self-regulatory and that industry efforts must be “embedded” in government 
regulation and oversight:  regulatory engineering in which the government injects transparency 
and accountability to remedy the industry’s natural drift away from these principles); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation: Reformulating State Action in Private Delegation Terms, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1471–72 (2003) (concluding that, because of the government’s 
regulatory and contractual powers as well as administrative resources, it is in the best position of 
ensuring accountability while privatization or regulatory delegation occurs); cf. RICHARD G. 
LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS:  GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG-
TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH 521–22 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (noting that “[p]olicies that work 
well are those that are designed to operate within the institutional competencies of the 
organizations that will administer them” and advising, that even among governments, there are 
variations in administrative competencies based on how a given bureaucracy is structured). 
 203. Jason Tanz, The Sharing Economy Needs to Start Sharing Its Data Too, WIRED 
(May 5, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/05/sharing-economy-fico/ (noting im-
mense data that sharing-economy companies collect). 
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hotel regulations and transportation regulations tend to derive from 
local government decisions.204 Ride-sharing businesses have much 
greater appeal in urban areas, where a critical mass of drivers exist and 
a robust participant community improves the reliability of feedback and 
increases consumer trust in the system. Proper regulation of this service 
for denser urban communities may require balancing a far different set 
of interests—ranging from traffic congestion to the local government’s 
involvement with licensed taxi drivers—than regulation of the same 
service in more suburban or rural communities. 
Moreover, because many shared economies depend on highly 
localized delivery of goods and services—sharing tangible shared 
resources or personal services available within a certain radius—the 
jurisdictional evasion that often plagues localized regulation schemes 
targeting online activity does not present a problem for this type of 
online business. If a market is large and lucrative enough, a business 
will have the incentive to work with the relevant governments of that 
locality to operate in that market. This helps preclude a race-to-the-
bottom scenario, unlike online activity where jurisdiction shopping is 
easy and the business’s activities can have widespread effect outside of 
the jurisdictions where it operates.205 At the same time, there is a limit 
to how idiosyncratically or restrictively local governments may impose 
regulation. Burdensome regulations may disincentivize businesses 
from setting up shop in certain jurisdictions and deter the development 
of useful businesses that address unmet demands and generate 
commerce for that community.206 
Those who strike the wrong balance of regulatory severity may 
have to stand idly by while other jurisdictions with stronger industry 
partnerships help define the flagship standards to govern these econ-
 204. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REG. CODE ch. 7, Reg. No. 1.504-1 (setting local 
policy on transient occupants of hotels and the taxes for collection); S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE 
§§ 1.2, 102 (claiming local authority to regulate transportation as a part of its general-welfare 
powers, subject to the general state scheme under the California Vehicle Code). See generally 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389 (1937) (recognizing that regulation of hotel- 
working conditions falls within the police power of states). 
 205. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with 
DRM, 84 DENV. L. REV. 181, 191–92 & n.52 (2006) (noting that where there is no legal consensus 
and nothing to tie the market actors to a particular actor to a particular location, regulatory 
arbitrage inevitably occurs, and that companies, facilitated by the jurisdictional ambiguity of the 
Internet, can race to the bottom to adhere to the most permissive jurisdiction). 
 206. See Jon Brooks, City by City, Lyft and Uber Take On Taxis, Regulators, KQED NEWS 
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2014/03/03/lyft-uber-regulation/ (surveying major 
cities and their stance on these ride-sharing companies and noting that currently, the companies 
must take a city by city policy battle). 
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omies. Incorporating the input of companies that span across jurisdic-
tions can be especially helpful for governments who do not wish to 
create new regulation from scratch, as such companies may have 
experience working with other jurisdictions. Moreover, as these 
companies are often both highly scalable and replicate their businesses 
across jurisdictions with ease, a regulatory structure that emulates 
others will be easier to implement and more likely to have staying 
power the more consistent it is with other jurisdictions’ approaches. 
4. Cost of Regulatory Failure and the Need for Minimum 
Standards 
Government should take a more significant role in regulating 
activities where a failed transaction implies irreversible high-risk 
consequences.207 Some sharing economies involve low-risk goods and 
services and uncomplicated sharing arrangements. For example, 
sharing college textbooks through Chegg involves uncomplicated 
sharing arrangements and low or familiar risks. At worst, a renter 
receives a textbook in poor condition or receives the wrong edition. A 
dissatisfying transaction is easily corrected: a renter can return the book 
for a more suitable one, and anyone who has used a library before is 
familiar with the risk that users may have to pay for a textbook that is 
lost or damaged on their watch.208 Furthermore, the sharing 
arrangement requires minimal ongoing interaction or interlocking 
rights between market participants. A renter uses the book as her own 
while she has it; her interactions with others who have shared claim to 
the book occur only when she first selects or finally returns the book. 
In circumstances such as these, regulators have good reason to think 
that the market participants are familiar with the risks they are incurring 
and that they are properly accounting for these risks in their 
expectations as they transact.209 Furthermore, the interactions are not 
so high-risk that the state may feel a compelling reason to intervene. 
Regulators may assess that any dissatisfying interactions that result are 
more of a customer service for the platform providers and a trial-and-
 207. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, MANAGING RISKS TO THE PUBLIC:  APPRAISAL GUIDANCE 
11–12 (2005), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment 
_data/file/191518/Managing_risks_to_the_public_appraisal_guidance.pdf. 
 208. See Chegg.com General Policies, CHEGG, http://www.chegg.com/generalpolicies/ (last 
updated July 31, 2014). 
 209. See Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N. KY. L. 
REV. 423, 428 (1997) (noting, in a strict products-liability context, that torts law does not 
anticipate that consumers require additional legal protections where the risks are common and 
familiar to users). 
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error issue for consumers than an issue requiring a regulatory safety 
net. There is no particular reason to think that the market is not properly 
incentivized to address such negative experiences and failures are not 
sufficiently costly to justify regulatory cost. 
By contrast, other sharing economies involve higher, more un-
familiar risks. Consider the difference in risk between trading outgrown 
children’s clothes through threadUP as opposed to hiring babysitters 
through TaskRabbit. The stakes of a single babysitting failure—
whether because of incompetence or evil intent—are extremely high 
compared to the compensable risk of having poor quality children’s 
clothing. Given that even a single failure can be disastrous and result 
in irreversible consequences, regulators may have an interest in 
creating some threshold of background checks or childcare 
certifications, equivalent to the type of requirements one may require 
for licensed child care provider in that jurisdiction. Circumstances 
where the stakes seem too high and too uniquely incompensable for the 
reputation system to do its filtering (for example, parents should not 
have to wait for poor ratings flagging abusive caretakers to accumulate 
before being alerted to a problem) may require some level of threshold-
setting and preliminary safety nets imposed by governments. 
This analysis suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach does not 
work for sharing economies; each type of sharing implicates different 
levels of coordination among transacting parties, different sources of 
friction and risk, and different areas of potential market imperfections. 
However, a goods-specific or service-specific regulatory scheme may 
create significant burdens for platforms that sell a variety of goods and 
services. For example, suppose a generalist site such as TaskRabbit 
would have to ensure proper equivalent regulations are met for diverse 
participants such as doctors, lawyers, and masseuses. This would occur 
much as a general marketplace such as eBay must police how to filter 
or process diverse goods, ranging from alcohol to adult material to 
goods hailing from restricted countries. This counsels for governments 
and the industry to be selective when making forays into co-regulation, 
leaving co-regulation only for those areas where risks associated with 
failures are high or where the new dependencies and interrelationships 
created by moving a traditional transactional activity online are 
unfamiliar enough for current regulatory schemes or market 
participants not to properly anticipate the types of risks involved.210 
 210. For example, suppose there were a hypothetical sharing-economy platform where 
lawyers can offer their services for discrete tasks. Because the various state bars regulate a 
baseline of lawyer quality and right to practice, any effort by the sharing platform to add its own 
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Taxation is another area where the government needs to exercise 
careful discernment in when to regulate. There is much clamor over 
whether the tax schemes that apply to older, non-technological business 
models should apply to these technology-enabled sharing economy 
business models, with no clearly reasoned out explanation of why the 
technology justifies the exceptionalism.211 In this context, two basic 
types of revenue generation can potentially be addressed. One type of 
government generation—fees212—involves collecting money from a 
given industry to offset the impact or governing cost of that industry. 
In the fee context, there is a direct relation between the activity 
regulated and the use of the money collected. If a sharing economy 
industry manages to skirt regulations in a way that allows it to avoid 
fees that otherwise would pay for some impact of that activity then this 
suggests that the sharing economy activity is, in essence, being 
subsidized by governmental activity. In such scenarios, the government 
has a ready policy rationale for why the fees should apply equally to 
old-model and new-model companies. Governments also have a 
rationale to exempt sharing economy companies if they do not fit the 
original rationales for the fees. Conversely, in a tax, no direct 
relationship is necessary and the government revenue generated is 
intended to facilitate other government functions. If the government 
revenue avoided has more tax-like properties, then the nature of the 
activity being taxed is likely less related to the purpose for the tax. In 
such a situation the regulator or policymaker will need to make the 
determination of whether extending the tax to the new industry is 
appropriate. This decision can be based on grounds of equitable 
treatment between similar enterprises, the need for government 
revenue, or the determination of whether additional tax burden upon a 
house regulations would be duplicative and possibly less apt than the regulations that the 
profession has already established for itself. This would be an instance where the sharing economy 
would not be the best actor to regulate. 
 211. See Andrés Martinez, Will the Sharing Economy Make Us All Republicans?, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/09/08/will-the 
-sharing-economy-make-us-all-republicans/ (arguing that squabbling over semantics to try to 
carve exceptions out of existing regulatory systems detracts from the impetus to reform what is 
wrong about the underlying regulatory system). 
 212. In California, a hub of new sharing-economy companies, the terms “tax” and “fees” 
also possess state constitutional significance. Thus, for regulators, these two categories represent 
the two fundamental mechanisms for the state to generate more revenue and are therefore more 
relevant in this context than more nuanced means of discussing revenue generation. Michael R. 
Johnson et al., State Constitutional Tax Limitations: The Colorado and California Experiences, 
35 URB. LAW. 817, 834 (2003); Samuel D. McVey, State Environmental Permit Fees Charged to 
Federal Facilities: Distinguishing Legal User Fees from Illegal Taxes, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
879, 884–89 (1989). 
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new firm will not outweigh its social utility and the benefits of sharing 
economy’s superior resource allocation.213 
5. Intensity of Regulatory Intervention Required 
Regulators should consider the level of regulatory intervention 
required to achieve the intended outcome when assessing feasibility 
and cost of enforcement. The level of control required may balloon the 
amount of resources that regulators must invest in order to successfully 
control the market. For example, regulatory solutions that attempt to 
restrict market entry or enforce market exits will require significant 
control over the market and of the platform providers that are permitted 
to exist to ensure fair rates in return for controlled competition.214 This 
sort of regulation is only feasible when the nature of the industry is 
highly networked, high barriers of entry exist naturally, black market 
duplication is difficult, and the market is capable of sustaining only a 
few key players.215 The difficulty of controlling shared economy 
platforms to this level of intensity comes in the jurisdictional 
independence of the platform’s nerve center. For example, despite 
being highly network-dependent and requiring tangible, localized 
delivery of goods and services, the coordination of information and 
transactions occurs on a platform that need not be housed in a 
cooperative jurisdiction. If regulators wanted to outlaw an out-of-
jurisdiction platform active in the local market, they would have to find 
some jurisdictionally credible way to attack its assets or legality, solicit 
the platform’s voluntary cooperation, or resort to prosecuting local 
market participants one at a time in order to increase perceived risk and 
decrease participation rates. This requires investigators and enforcers 
on the streets—a resource-intensive proposition.216 
 213. Keith A. Tucker et al., Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Companies: The Evolution 
of a Tax Law Responding to Change, 37 SW. L.J. 891, 939 (1984) (identifying some principles to 
apply when determining when to extend taxation). 
 214. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1 (2006) (discussing the antitrust role in enforcing laws governing market entry 
and exit). 
 215. Joseph A. Pantoja, Desirable Economic Cooperation Among High-Technology 
Industries: A Look at Telephone and Cable, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 644 (1994) (dis-
cussing such high technology industries with significant infrastructure needs). These market 
conditions also characterize areas with high antitrust concern. See Maurice E. Stucke, 
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 556–58 (2012). 
 216. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fishman, Copyright Infringement and the Separated Powers of 
Moral Entrepreneurship, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359, 380, 382 (2014) (recounting that prosecu-
tors targeted the facilitating platform, as low-hanging fruit, rather than individual lawbreakers in 
enforcing copyright-infringement law because of resource limitations and the relative difficulty 
of effective change through the prosecution of individuals). 
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Interventions that regulate the quality of products and services or 
the imposition of local fees and taxes, by contrast, may require less 
market control because the regulator need not entirely obliterate a 
participant or prohibit a platform’s existence.217 Compromises and 
voluntary coordinated action are much more plausible, especially 
where regulators can leverage existing industry-wide incentives to 
improve the safety and low-risk reputation of the industry or to 
coordinate collective action that can result in long-term benefits and 
the expansion of the market. Even in regulations whose benefits inure 
largely to the state, such as taxes, businesses may be willing to 
coordinate a platform-specific response in order to save their partici-
pants the uncertainty and difficulty of navigating and complying with 
local laws on their own.218 
Substantive interventions, in themselves, come with regulatory 
costs. Because of the volatility of the sharing economy, regulations 
may have a short lifespan, proving too burdensome for a regulator 
operating on a fixed annual budget.219 From a purely financial perspec-
tive this favors a regulatory solution that limits the burden upon the 
regulator and displaces some of that regulatory cost into the anticipated 
cost of doing business anticipated by the prospective regulated entity. 
For example, depending on the specificity of the acts that the 
regulations target or the speed at which the business model evolves, 
regulators may need to update substantive regulations too frequently to 
maintain a formal regulatory structure, making the payoff of each 
costly regulatory cycle low.220 In order to consider the effect that the 
 217. As an analogy, New York’s Form 1304 requires notification of the New York 
Department of State in order for out-of-state corporations to operate in-state. See DIV. OF CORP., 
STATE RECORDS AND UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF STATE, Application for 
Authority, available at http://www.dos.ny.gov/forms/corporations/1335-f-l.pdf (last visited Oct. 
11, 2014). Similarly, recognizing the sharing-economy company’s right to operate in exchange 
for its submission to jurisdictional and registration requirements may be a compromise and first 
step toward mutual cooperation to accomplish the government’s policy goals. 
 218. Thomas Barrabi, Airbnb Legalized in Portland: New Approach Could Serve as 
Blueprint for Other Cities, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com 
/airbnb-legalized-portland-new-approach-could-serve-blueprint-other-cities-1646398 (showing 
Airbnb’s willingness to facilitate tax collection in exchange for official recognition of its legality); 
Lyft New York Update, LYFT BLOG (July 11, 2014), http://blog.lyft.com/posts/2014 
/7/11/lyft-new-york-update (conceding to New York Supreme Court in postponing launch of 
Lyft’s expansion into New York City and expressing willingness to modify business model to 
comply with city taxi and limousine regulations). 
 219. Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 376 (2004) (identifying that an important goal of e-rulemaking is to lower 
what can be high-administrative costs for developing regulations). 
 220. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1354 (2013) (discussing impediments to regulatory action); Lynn 
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nature of the market places on the cost-efficiency of the regulatory 
cycle, regulators would need to consider the similarity of the regulated 
online shared-economy activity with the offline economic activity and 
the extent to which the traditional regulatory schemes that applied to 
the offline economic activity applies to the network-facilitated online 
activity. Where the online activity closely mirrors the offline 
transactions that the traditional regulations govern and the rules are of 
sufficiently general applicability that they do not need to be modified, 
the regulatory cost is low.221 
For example, whether purchased online or by paper order, custom 
taxes apply across the board. Online marketplaces such as eBay may 
outsource the custom tax calculations to Pitney Bowes to make the 
logistics of handling different jurisdictions easier for their small-time 
sellers and buyers.222 No significant adjustments are necessary to apply 
the traditional rules to the new marketplace. Regulations such as 
minimum levels of car insurance required to drive in California may 
apply equally to single-ownership cars as with shared cars. By contrast, 
online marketplaces such as Airbnb may introduce new wrinkles into 
traditional laws because of the interlocking rights involved in closely 
shared ownership with strangers (e.g., simultaneously occupying the 
same apartment, albeit in different rooms, and sharing common space, 
via on-the-spot transactions), such that further regulation is necessary 
to govern these additional sources of friction. Changing the mix of 
temporary renters and permanent residents of a city and altering the 
mix of available housing units in each type of housing can significantly 
change the character of the city and the affordability of living there, 
such that local municipal law may seek to impose special limitations to 
counter the increased level of shared-economy transactions.223 
E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the Problem of 
Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1714 (2008) (discussing a theory of “regulatory ruts” to 
explain the difficulty in updating rules). 
 221. For example, regulators and platforms need not necessarily create new standards for 
professional services offered online if the profession itself has already created comprehensive 
regulations for itself (for example, the licensing requirements determined by medical, legal, or 
religious professionals). Any online regulation would limit itself to considerations unique to 
offering these services online. 
 222. See eBay.com Global Shipping Program Buyer Terms & Conditions, EBAY, 
http://pages.ebay.com/shipping/globalshipping/buyer-tnc.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).  
 223. See Steven T. Jones, Chiu Introduces Legislation To Regulate Airbnb and Short-Term 
Housing Rentals, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2014, 10:49 AM), http://www.sfbg.com 
/politics/2014/04/15/chiu-introduces-legislation-airbnb-and-short-term-housing-rentals; Steven 
T. Jones, New Coalition Opposes Chiu’s Airbnb Legislation, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2014, 
3:24 PM), http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2014/04/28/new-coalition-opposes-chius-airbnb 
-legislation-updated (providing reasons why regulation is necessary to maintain city housing 
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Regulators may seek the approach of targeting their regulations to 
require certain outcomes, rather than requiring certain activities, to 
reduce the strain of updating rules with every shift in activity that 
affects a particularly rapidly developing economy. That is exactly what 
the updated proposals to the San Francisco hotel tax regulations do: 
instead of targeting shared economy activities, it targets the end-
problem—the frequency with which real estate lenders (both those who 
rent out their real estate traditionally and those who rent out using 
shared economy platforms) can lend out their spaces before becoming 
subject to the hotel tax. Similarly, regulators may require certain 
outcomes, such as requiring companies to provide certain disclosures, 
without requiring them to adopt substantive rules or particular business 
models.224 
Whether deciding whether to impose regulation unilaterally, 
solicit co-regulatory efforts, or to leave to self-regulation, regulators 
should carefully consider what sort of control is within their juris-
dictional and practical power and whether the unique features of the 
targeted shared economy require an adjustment of the traditional rules. 
6. Conflicts of Public and Private Interests 
The degree of conflict between public and private interests and the 
degree of consistency in interests between companies will hamper the 
emergence of self-regulation.225 Importantly, co-regulatory efforts are 
generally less successful when they address distributive conflict or 
otherwise affect market competition.226 Again, these factors depend on 
the type of regulatory control desired and the type of market activity 
targeted for regulation. For example, if a market is still relatively new, 
with widely varying business models, low barriers of entry, and no 
clear oligopoly of main characters, regulators may wish to rethink their 
timing in intervening in the market with regulation. When a market is 
uncertain, co-regulatory efforts with just a few early cooperative actors 
may have the effect of prematurely resolving competitive market 
dilemmas.227 Where regulations touch key areas of market competition, 
stock, spread the tax burden equitably, and address zoning concerns). 
 224. Saurwein, supra note 144, at 345–46. 
 225. ANDREAS FREYTAG & KLAUS WINKLER, THE ECONOMICS OF SELF-REGULATION IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNDER SUNSET LEGISLATION (Hans-Walter Lorenz & Armin Scholl eds., 
2004), available at http://www.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/wpsw1704.pdf. 
 226. Héritier & Lehmkuhl, supra note 200, at 12–15. 
 227. However, while co-regulatory opportunities increase the fewer actors involved in a 
given industry, concerns remain that such efforts may shut out new entrants. See, e.g., Robert 
Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless Concept “Group Boycott,” 39 VAND. L. REV. 
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regulators may have to weigh whether the public interest is sufficiently 
urgent to require early regulation as opposed to adopting a wait-and-
see approach to see how the market matures. 
The above discusses clashes among private entities. But different 
entities representing the public interest may conflict with one another 
as well. For example, many local and state authorities oversee 
consumer protection, and agencies’ jurisdictional mandates may 
overlap. A shared economy platform’s representations regarding lia-
bility coverage may interest state agencies overseeing insurance, state 
and local government agencies overseeing consumer fraud, and 
municipal agencies responsible for enforcing ordinances that govern 
that particular market. Co-regulation that reconciles these competing 
mandates may require coordinating several agencies’ interests or 
certain agencies purposely refraining for entering certain spaces of 
regulation needlessly.228 
Moreover, private and public entities may clash between each 
other depending on how divergent their interests may be. This may 
correlate strongly with whether the industry as a whole recognizes a 
collective interest in the reputation of the industry. For example, if the 
industry recognizes the collective effects of building the credibility and 
reducing the risk of the industry to change consumer patterns to adjust 
to a trust-based economy, public entities may be able to leverage this 
enlightened self-interest to spur the industry to agree to certain baseline 
consumer and liability protections. This may require the public entities 
to engage in vocal publicizing of deficits in the current market’s 
protection levels in order to dispel the misplaced trust of market 
participants, so that the industry will have to re-earn the trust using 
equally publicized reforms and guarantees.229 However, resolving 
clashes between private and public entities may not be as feasible if 
industry does not see a collective benefit to cooperating with public 
authorities. For example, if, notwithstanding the public entity’s 
awareness-building efforts, a significant proportion of the consumer or 
labor participants do not embrace the need for threshold wage-hour 
1507, 1568–74 (1986) (discussing oligopolistic mechanisms for consolidating market power and 
limiting competitive threats). 
 228. For examples of regulatory clash between agencies where jurisdictional roles are not 
clear, see Healey, supra note 79. 
 229. Shafer, supra note 34 (reporting how attitudes of the ridesharing companies changed 
after the media publicized the insurance gap and provoked public concern); Julie Bort, An Airbnb 
Guest Held a Huge Party in This New York Penthouse and Trashed It, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 
2014, 9:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-an-airbnb-guest-trashed-a 
-penthouse-2014-3?op=1 (obtaining relief for Airbnb user, whose reimbursement claims were 
rebuffed and calls ignored, by publicizing her horror story with one rental). 
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restraints or certain environmental regulations, certain private entities 
may sense a conflict between the public entity’s regulation and the 
private market’s preferences and decline to cooperate with regulation 
that does not seem to reflect their customers’ preferences. 
Selecting between self-regulation, co-regulation, and full-blown 
government-derived regulation may require an honest evaluation of 
whether the market participants have buy-in for the public entity’s 
goals and whether this disconnect derives from irrationality, market 
pathologies, and externalities or an outdated and misguided regulatory 
concern. Given the limited political capital available to each public 
entity, government regulators may wish to prioritize pursuing only a 
few key policies that implicate public and private conflicts—policies 
that protect against public harms and externalities of the highest order. 
For example, if an unscrupulous online platform and an equally 
conscience-less subsector of the market built a profitable shared 
economy model based on the sale of underpriced child labor or sold 
illicit adult services based on trafficked victims, it would not matter 
that neither the platform nor the market participants were receptive to 
the government entity’s goals of limiting child labor or forced prosti-
tution—the government may nevertheless choose to fight the uphill 
battle of cracking down on users or the enabling platform, regardless 
of the conflict in interest.230 But where a herculean effort may make 
sense for particularly pressing issues of public interest, they may not be 
justified for lesser priorities or markets in which the externalities are 
minimal and the market participants appear to have knowledgeably 
reached an equilibrium of protections demanded and supplied. 
7. Number of Participants and Market Fragmentation 
There is strong evidence that self-regulation works less in 
fragmented markets with a diverse range of providers since the greater 
number of entities involved the more difficult it is to establish 
standards.231 In particular, the fragmented repair sector in Britain 
experienced eleven failed attempts to self-regulate over a thirty-year 
period.232 The notable exception to the difficulty in establishing self-
 230. See Nicole Norfleet, Classified-Ads Website Backpage.com Under Fire Over Sex 
Trafficking, STAR TRIBUNE (June 10, 2012, 10:16 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local 
/minneapolis/158383545.html (reporting on difficulty of curbing sex trafficking that occurs on 
Backpage and Backpage’s lackluster attempts to self-regulate against this activity but also 
reporting that government efforts persist, nevertheless, to oppose, shame, or impede it, with 
significant investment of resources because of the social priority of opposing such crimes). 
 231. Ronit & Schneider, supra note 194, at 262.  
 232. Ed Mayo & Philip Cullum, The Consumer Agenda on Regulation, in 
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regulatory standards to a fragmented market is when smaller subsets of 
actors were organized and regulated and gradually, over time, 
transformed into more complex institutional arrangements.233  
When viewed as a whole, the diversity of shared economies 
available online reveals a highly fragmented landscape, making global, 
one-size-fits-all regulation for shared economies impractical. When 
viewed at the level of specificity that regulations would target (e.g., 
regulations are unlikely to target activity common to all shared 
economies but rather target a particular locality and a substantive area 
based on the public needs concerning that substantive area, such as 
housing, transportation, temp services, meals, household goods, 
clothing), a particular market may vary in the level of fragmentation, 
depending on barriers to entry, the size of the market, and the im-
portance of participating in a large network to the market participants. 
For example, a matured ride-sharing market is not likely to have a large 
number of participants in separate networks because those who seek 
rides have a strong incentive to join the largest, most well-established 
network in order to maximize selection and increase their chances of 
finding a suitable nearby ride quickly. The tendency toward established 
networks increases the barrier to entry and creates a rich-get-richer 
scenario where the platform providers owning the largest networks, by 
simple virtue of being the largest, attract most of the market 
participants in that locality. 
In contrast, a matured clothes-sharing network will not necessarily 
coalesce into a few key platform-providers because items in a wardrobe 
are not as fungible as rides. Niche markets catering to particular tastes 
and quality thresholds allow for ready differentiation and reduce 
barriers to entry. In short, the clothes-sharing market does not benefit 
from network effects beyond a certain point. A consumer is just as 
happy to belong to a small, exclusive clothes-sharing network that 
caters to his or her preferences as to a larger network that offers a wider 
selection but provides about the same number of clothes that fit his or 
her preferences; there is no obvious benefit to belonging to a larger 
network, except perhaps in relation to peripheral bargaining advantages 
(e.g., perhaps the platform provider will be able to negotiate a better 
insurance policy to cover unsatisfactory transactions because of the 
number of participants insured). 
COMMUNICATIONS THE NEXT DECADE 87–97 (Ed Richards et al. eds., 2006). 
 233. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 185–90 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990). 
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Thus the level of fragmentation may depend on the precise nature 
of the good or service sold, the importance of a large network to the 
market participants, and the stickiness of a network in retaining 
participants over competitors of market share. Furthermore, if the 
shared good or service necessarily depends on localized delivery (e.g., 
housing located in a particular neighborhood, rides available within a 
certain radius to a consumer’s current location, or people available on 
short notice to perform a task for which physical presence is necessary), 
this characteristic of that particular market may mean that regulators 
may be able to easily identify the key active market participants 
affected by a proposed local regulation. 
In assessing the feasibility of co-regulating the market, regulators 
should therefore first identify the scope of the type of regulation they 
would like to implement—what precise sectors and localities they seek 
to encompass with the regulation—then conduct a market-specific 
analysis on the number of major participants within that market sector 
and locality they would need to engage in order to launch a successful 
collaborative regulation effort. Determining the number of participants 
a maturing market can sustain can give a plausible prediction of 
whether regulators will be able to engage enough participants or 
whether, even if all key players were to participant in the co-regulation 
effort, whether the potential decision-makers are too numerous and the 
key leaders too uncertain to forge industry-wide standards or consensus 
regarding self-regulation or co-regulation measures. 
8. Availability of Organizations to Assume Regulatory 
Tasks 
On a related note, the maturity of the market may affect the ease 
with which successful co-regulation can occur.234 Smaller markets or 
industry sectors generally mature faster than larger ones and regulatory 
structures can converge over time to establish a consolidated self-
regulatory scheme.235 If certain market subsectors quickly become 
saturated with an oligarchy of dominant firms and the market has 
barriers of entry sufficiently large to create some stability in the roster 
of key players, the market naturally presents a few candidates to take 
up leadership in establishing standards and building market 
 234. Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 138, at 134. 
 235. This has been particularly noted in the convergence of voluntary initiatives for global 
labor standards and the development of the International Labour Organization (ILO). The UN 
Global Compact developed similarly. Anke Hassel, The Evolution of a Global Labor Governance 
Regime, 21 GOVERNANCE 231, 232, 247 (2008). 
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expectations. Self-regulation becomes more feasible when the practices 
of a few firms define the standard practice of the industry, requiring a 
number of entities to agree in order to shape a practice into an industry 
standard.236 Dominant firms can cooperate for joint branding of certain 
certifications to promote adherence to industry-wide standards and to 
ostracize nonparticipants, much like realtor groups certify member 
realtors to combat against nonparticipant realtors and to enhance the 
reputation of the profession. By contrast, where widely divergent 
practices exist among a large number of entities, agreement on best 
practices and the establishment of clear norms becomes more difficult. 
If the market is not ready to embrace a dominant standard, a few 
leaders’ attempts to enforce industry-wide standards, to bully others 
into compliance, or to campaign against nonparticipants may be seen 
as anticompetitive or ineffective. 
Where a market transitions to maturity, self-regulatory limitations 
may converge. Competing models of product or service differentiation 
may eventually settle on certain norms; what began as features may 
become expected standards as market participants become accustomed 
to certain protections and demand them as a matter of course.237 
Because the shared economy depends so heavily on trust, reputation, 
and perceptions of low risk, the threat of a race-to-the-bottom or of 
detractors imposing low standards is less than other economies where 
self-regulation does not depend on such transparency and fickle, 
instantaneous consumer perceptions. 
Furthermore, the stronger the nexus of the shared economy 
activity to the physical locality of the jurisdiction where the regulation 
applies, the lower the risk of forum shopping and regulatory evasion. 
Unlike illegal activities such as online gambling, platform-providers 
who choose to break or evade the law in shared economies cannot 
simply relocate to a jurisdictional haven and continue on business-as-
usual from there, because the sharing usually involves the barter of a 
tangible, localized good or service, rather than a conceptualized online 
 236. Nairi, Eliminating Ridesharing Insurance Ambiguity, UBER BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://blog.uber.com/uberXridesharinginsurance (providing insurance coverage for the “gap” 
periods when drivers are available for fares but not currently carrying a passenger and 
characterizing the company’s insurance policy as an anticipatory “step to eliminate any ambiguity 
while the insurance industry and state governments update policies and regulations for the new 
world of ridesharing transportation”); Shafer, supra note 34. 
 237. Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, 
or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 440 (2011) (identifying the development of 
customer demands as they become accustomed to greater privacy-protective mechanisms initially 
arising through self-regulatory efforts). 
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experience or asset.238 Perhaps strategic forum shopping and placement 
of central offices may shield companies from becoming entirely shut 
down or having headquarters assets seized, and perhaps it can force 
regulators through the inefficient process of punishing market 
participants rather than the platform providers, but it cannot entirely 
avoid the reach of the law as long as it depends on the sharing of 
tangible, localized goods and services.239 
For that reason, the diversity of local laws and the different mix 
of market share holders in different jurisdictions do not necessarily 
present an obstacle to local regulators finding a sufficiently 
consolidated base of leadership to assume regulatory tasks on behalf of 
the local iteration of the shared economy.240 Usually the proliferation 
of market fiefdoms and the fragmented state of the market does not 
present a good environment for recognizable industry leaders to form 
and to create binding or highly persuasive standards. However, in the 
case of sharing economies, where the regulators implicated tend to be 
local (for example, taxi authorities seeking to regulate shared rides, 
housing authorities seeking to set rules on shared housing), local 
leadership is more than sufficient for the purpose of creating effective 
co-regulation relationships to govern the economic activity in that local 
jurisdiction. For example, it does not matter that Landshare is a major 
urban garden-space sharing platform in the United Kingdom and that 
Sharing Backyards is more popular in the United States, as long as the 
local land use regulators can identify whether their particular 
jurisdiction has a few key leaders to help shape the trajectory of that 
local iteration of the sharing economy. The key is to evaluate whether 
sufficient consolidation of power exists in the relevant market and 
locality to facilitate some level of industry-led or facilitated regulation. 
9. Intensity of Competition 
Although the empirical evidence is still in development, a theory 
exists that the more intense the competition the less willing firms will 
 238. See Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing About Online Liability 
and Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1062 (2010) (focusing on the example of 
banning Internet gambling, which often involves offshore companies seeking to evade 
jurisdiction, by enlisting the help of payment intermediaries that are within the jurisdiction of the 
local law and have too much at stake not to move out of the range of jurisdictional reach). 
 239. For example, if a ride-sharing company wishes to expand to a particular city, the cars 
on its network must physically traverse the roads of that city; if a room-sharing company wishes 
to expand offerings to a certain region, it must find participants who physically own property in 
that region. This gives tangible targets for government enforcers to contact and pressure to limit 
the company’s behavior. 
 240. Saurwein, supra note 144, at 348. 
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be to accept any voluntary regulatory burden beyond the mandatory 
standards.241 Additionally, self-regulatory programs may also increase 
a firm’s competitive position.242 Where no consensus exists and firms 
operate in a market in which flexibility in competitive strategy is key, 
sharing economy firms may see various strategies of self-regulation as 
a competitive advantage rather than an industry baseline. For example, 
deciding to provide more comprehensive insurance coverage for the 
shared economy activity than one’s competitors may be a competitive 
decision rather than a norm to advocate among one’s peers. 
Whether collective decision-making trumps the drive to compete 
and differentiate may depend, again, on the distinct nature of the 
particular market in question and, specifically, whether the industry has 
more to gain by increasing the size of the whole pie rather than 
squabbling over a bigger share of the existing pie. If the type of 
collective action proposed stands to improve the reputation of the 
industry as a whole and there is still a large untapped market of 
potential customers that have yet to transition into participants, then the 
industry stands to gain by combining their efforts to woo this untapped 
market.243 In such situations, the problem is not that the targeted 
consumer is selecting one sharing economy firm over another; the 
problem is that the targeted consumer is not considering that sharing 
economy market at all. To entice customers away from traditional 
markets and toward the equivalent sharing economy market, even firms 
locked in intense competition may agree to cooperate as an industry for 
the sake of increasing the customer base.244 
Regulators considering the likelihood of success in facilitating a 
co-regulatory body should not only consider the level of competition 
 241. HAUFLER, supra note 140, at 43–44 (explaining that competitive burdens only increase 
voluntary regulatory compliance if it can be turned into a competitive advantage, such as when 
reputational gains are themselves marketed as a part of branding). 
 242. Cannon, supra note 176 (identifying self-regulatory options and their benefits). 
 243. See, e.g., Introducing the Open Automotive Alliance, OPEN AUTOMOTIVE ALLIANCE, 
http://www.openautoalliance.net/#about (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (describing a coalition of car 
manufacturers and technology companies seeking to “bring[] the Android platform to cars starting 
in 2014”); cf. About Us, BEEF IT’S WHAT’S FOR DINNER, http://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com 
/aboutus.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2014) (explaining how the National Cattlemen’s Beef 
Association, as funded from a national government-mandated program called the Beef Checkoff, 
promotes generally the brand of “beef” and promotes the demand for the industry as a whole).  
 244. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 420 (2011) (identifying how industries cooperate and self-
regulatory motives are strongest when they the industry’s collective perception of itself is as a 
“community of fate” with each company’s future prosperity “seen as depending upon its ability 
to impose collective self-restraint on its members’ profit-seeking activities in the name of public 
safety.”). 
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among the sharing economy firms but also the extent to which the 
competing firms are open to the possibility of self-interested collective 
action. If for whatever reason, whether market conditions or historical 
relationships, a cooperative attitude does not exist among the firms, the 
government regulators may need to do the legwork in finding common 
ground, building bridges, and facilitating the dialogue necessary to 
create an environment conducive to working as a coalition to build 
baseline regulations. If not much potential for common ground exists 
or if industry interests do not align with government interests, then the 
government has to proceed more unilaterally by selecting priority areas 
to regulate and enforce certain baselines. 
10. The Extent to Which Public Policy Objectives Are 
Supported by the Existing Industry Culture 
In keeping with the theme introduced in the previous factor, an 
industry’s preexisting sensitivity to the public interest and a desire to 
cooperate with existing authorities can be an especially important 
factor in the development of a co-regulatory solution. Government 
regulators, using their inherent institutional advantages in mobilizing 
public support and lending credibility to industry’s social accounta-
bility or public-minded measurers, can help promote steps that they 
view as legitimate by giving positive press, actively helping build 
credibility to those who are trying to mobilize industry consensus for 
useful reforms, or adopting industry standards and enforcing the rules 
against free-riding noncompliant firms. 
But even where the overlap between government and industry 
interests do not readily appear, government can leverage the reputation-
dependent and perception-conscious nature of sharing economies to 
incentivize cooperation. Sharing economy companies frequently 
publicly market themselves as filling a great social role of resource 
allocation, and many of their claims do legitimately reflect a social 
good in reducing overconsumption, inefficient allocation of resources, 
and underutilization of existing items and services of value. This 
collaborative ethos provides some of the strongest means of facilitating 
self-regulatory measures.245 By bringing hidden problems and 
inadequate protections out into the open, government regulators can 
force the issue by making a previously underappreciated or ignored 
deficiency in market protections into a highly publicized concern. In 
 245. RENATE MAYNTZ, FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL STEERING IN 
MODERN SOCIETIES 7–8 (2003), available at http://www.ioew.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DOK 
UMENTE/Veranstaltungen/2003/SuA2Mayntz.pdf. 
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some cases, consumer awareness is sufficient to change firm behavior; 
as consumers begin to assess risk and needs accurately, they may 
demand levels of protection more consistent with their informed long-
term interests. However, where the nature of the good or service shared 
creates a disconnect between the type of protection that a consumer 
might think about in advance and the type of protection a consumer or 
a third-party member of the public might want if she had perfect 
information, there is a potential role for co-regulation. For example, 
until an Uber driver’s car accident resulted in death, many Uber drivers 
might have never thought about whether Uber’s insurance policies 
would cover them while they are in between rides.246  
Only where externalities exist, where the interest of the 
government and the public at large is not reflected among any of the 
market participants, might the government have a genuine conflict that 
chafes against industry culture, and even then, all is not lost. Realizing 
that death, taxes, and externality regulations are inevitabilities, 
companies may resign themselves to minimizing their negative effect 
rather than opposing the regulations outright: facilitating ease of 
compliance with such rules by building in compliance as an automated 
part of the transaction (e.g., collecting hotel taxes automatically as a 
part of renting out a room), publicizing their compliance to get a 
corporate citizen image boost,247 and picking their battles in order to 
ensure a relatively unperturbed continuance of business as usual in that 
jurisdiction. Industry may even seek to self-regulate anticipatorily in 
order to crowd the regulatory space with rules of their own design, 
finding that pathway preferable to the alternative of accepting the 
unilateral regulations handed down from the government. 
In any case, regulators should consider the overlaps in interests to 
assess the level of resistance they can expect to encounter when seeking 
co-regulatory cooperative efforts with industry. The fact that such 
obstacles exist does not necessarily doom the effort, but properly 
anticipating the areas of resistance is an important first step in seeking 
 246. Dan Levin & Sarah McBride, Ride Service Uber Faces New Lawsuit After Fatal San 
Francisco Crash, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2014, 7:56 PM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014 
/01/28/us-uber-accident-lawsuit-idUSBREA0R02820140128.  
 247. See David Owen, Collecting and Remitting Taxes in San Francisco, AIRBNB 
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/collecting-remitting-taxes-san-francisco/ (repre-
senting the company view characterizing its agreement to remit taxes to San Francisco as 
cooperative, progressive, and a step forward, despite the company’s earlier resistance to the idea); 
David Hantman, New York Update, AIRBNB (Aug. 22, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb 
.com/new-york-community-update/ (releasing press statement giving Airbnb’s official spin on its 
settlement to comply with the New York Attorney General’s subpoena and characterizing late 
efforts to provide legal disclaimers and ban bad actors in a positive light). 
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ways to leverage existing incentives, relationships, or the fear of 
becoming regulated by others if they do not participate in the regulation 
themselves, in order to build a cooperative co-regulatory partnership. 
For example, regulators must act on principled reasons for 
distinguishing between when a business model runs awry of 
regulations that still have relevant and timely public purposes, and 
when an obsolete business model is using outdated regulations as a 
protectionist measure.248 
11. Involvement of Government Actors 
The nature and capacity of governmental actors is a fundamental 
aspect of the co-regulatory puzzle and, again, the level of government 
involvement necessary depends heavily on the type of regulation 
sought and the type of industry targeted for regulation. According to 
earlier literature on co-regulation, while the manner of governmental 
involvement can span from encouragement to auditing, co-regulatory 
mechanisms require that the government must lend authority via formal 
approval, direct control and accreditation of organizations/norms in 
order to increase the likelihood of successful implementation of these 
jointly derived regulations.249 Although all of the above steps—formal 
approval, direct control, and accreditation—are traditionally 
government roles, there is no prohibition against industry taking on 
these roles. In some cases, industry may be the best-suited actor to take 
on these roles. 
For example, the volatility of firms in the sharing economies 
makes industry self-regulation between firms difficult. When firms 
operate leanly, with limited compliance protocols, and with unproven 
business models, cross-industry self-regulation is unlikely to arise 
organically. Co-regulators must assess the character of the economy 
they are trying to regulate—the diffusion of market share, the ease with 
which an unregulated “black market” may form and permit evasion, the 
strategic points at which a noncompliant “rogue” business’s activity 
would form depends on other entities over which the government or the 
industry leaders exercise some control—and tailor an enforcement plan 
 248. For an example of how the federal government analyzes a target market to assess its 
suitability for various types of regulation, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circularsa004a-4. 
 249. Tony Porter & Karsten Ronit, Self-Regulation as Policy Process: The Multiple and 
Criss-Crossing Stages of Private Rule Making, 39 POL’Y SCIENCE 41, 55–59 (2006). 
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that best leverages the pressure points at which a noncompliant 
business may be incentivized to adhere to a regulation.250 
The above safeguards against overly evasive businesses or overly 
restrictive governments presume that governments know when they are 
being overly intrusive. Some have expressed concern regarding 
whether policymakers responsible for crafting the laws and 
requirements will not adequately understand the industries they regu-
late and impose impractical requirements that can needlessly under-
mine business competitiveness. The volatility in the market also 
counsels against regulatory intervention that may ossify requirements 
that do not keep pace with changes.251 Likewise, rules could quickly 
grow out-of-date and ill-suited to their intended purpose.252 
Furthermore, although shared economies are evolving quickly enough 
that lawmakers should allow room for regulatory experimentation 
among jurisdictions, the existence of a patchwork landscape of 
conflicting legal expectations can add to the cost of business and pro-
duce uncertainty in the customer base.253 Governments may not have 
all of the information necessary to appreciate the extent to which their 
regulations reduce efficiencies or quash innovation, even as businesses 
may underestimate the price of obtaining these efficiencies at the 
expense of societal costs or undervalued risk to the consumer. All of 
these attributes suggest that traditional legislation and the bulky notice-
and-comment procedures that accompany government-run rulemaking 
do not provide a good fit with the type of flexible, rapidly-evolving 
online activity that governments are trying to regulate.254 
 250. See Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 611, 619 (2011) 
(identifying scenarios that favor evasion).  
 251. See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, 
and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2008) (identifying how 
regulations regarding technology under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts periodically grow 
outdated). 
 252. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 
665, 684, & n.71 (2010) (comparing the relative success of regulating radar detectors after the 
technology’s most significant advancements versus the regulation of music piracy which has 
repeatedly failed to match the pace of technological change). 
 253. See Raphael Minder & Mark Scott, Sharing Economy Faces Patchwork of Guidelines 
in European Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2014, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2014/09/22/technology/sharing-economy-faces-patchwork-of-guidelines-in-european-coun 
tries.html. 
 254. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of 
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 959 (2008) (finding that “[a]ll but one of 
the ten main agencies studied here took under two years, on average, to go from an NPRM to a 
final rule or action,” suggesting a long turnaround for official rulemaking). 
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Iterative regulatory engagement is vital. A co-regulatory model 
should aim for organizational flexibility by considering informal 
agreements between major players rather than formal rulemaking pro-
cesses, while having safeguards to combat the tendency against trans-
parency and accountability. The swiftness and decisiveness of working 
with a small team of government regulators and industry leaders must 
be tempered with periodic checkpoints to reevaluate whether public 
needs have been adequately addressed, whether the solutions proposed 
have had the intended effect, and whether the norms of the shared 
economy have since evolved, requiring a revised response.255 The co-
regulation team should also build in established and visible feedback 
channels to report the team’s progress and solicit the public and 
industry members at large who are not active participants of the co-
regulation team.256 Building these feedback loops into the structure 
may involve a less formalized process than the notice-and-comment 
process, and most checkpoints may involve internal discussions rather 
than public vetting of policy, but frequent reevaluation is important to 
creating a regulatory framework that rapidly adjusts to a growing and 
volatile sector of the sharing economy.257 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS COLLABORATIVE CO-REGULATION 
Given the nascent landscape of sharing economy regulation and 
the absence of any one dominant regulatory scheme, it is up to the 
current leaders of the sharing industry and local government regulators 
to set the tone and content of the discussion and to proactively combat 
the concern that sharing economy companies blatantly flout law in 
pursuit of business.258 Cities competing for new economic growth 
 255. John Burbank, The Rise of the “Sharing” Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (June 5, 2014, 
4:46 PM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-burbank/the-rise-of-the-sharing-e_b 
_5454710.html (discussing evolving norms from a business-strategy perspective).  
 256. Marian Garcia Martinez et al., Co-Regulation as a Possible Model for Food Safety 
Governance: Opportunities for Public–Private Partner, 32 FOOD POL’Y 299, 301 fig.1 (2007) 
(identifying steps co-regulation may adopt with specific emphasis on soliciting information on 
public impact).  
 257. Kuo, supra note 182. 
 258. David Streitfeld, Airbnb Will Hand Over Host Data to New York, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 21, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/technology/airbnb-will 
-hand-over-host-data-to-new-york.html (reporting one state senator’s public comment that despite 
recent concessions with the city, “Airbnb remains a scofflaw company whose business model is 
at odds not just with multiple New York laws, but with the basics of the New York City real-
estate market”); see Editorial, Dark Side of the Sharing Economy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 2014, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/opinion/the-dark-side-
of-the-sharing-economy.html (critiquing Airbnb’s current attempts to cooperate with govern-
ment regulators as seeming disingenuous and calling for more proactive self-policing and risk 
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opportunities should adopt a receptive, collaborative attitude toward 
sharing-economy companies, which in many ways function as small 
businesses and may decrease rates of underemployment.259 Local 
governments can play dual roles as both regulator to protect public 
safety and meet the goals of good regulation while also serving as a 
collaborator and facilitator, ushering in tech talent and jobs, serving as 
early adopters, measuring impacts, and making public and private 
assets more available for residents.260 Governments that become early 
adopters stand to gain, as their successful models of governance 
proliferate across jurisdictions, carried by companies whose activity 
spans across multiple markets and who will likely proselytize models 
they have already adopted in other jurisdictions to promote a consistent 
policy in each of their active markets. Local decision makers can 
communicate with other cities about model policies for supporting the 
sharing sector. The coalescing of best practices, even when embellished 
with local customizations to suit local conditions, would save time and 
resources for municipalities across the country.261 Wise to this 
potential, San Francisco, Boston, and New York as well as many other 
cities have launched offices to apply high technology to urban 
governance.262  
disclosures to their users). 
 259. EU Sharing Economy Report, supra note 195, at 8 (providing some numbers and con-
cluding that sharing economy companies create jobs—both from direct employment of staff and 
from creating indirect employment by matchmaking labor supply with needs); cf. Fabio Rosati, 
The Biggest Unrecognized Opportunity in the Sharing Economy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 
2014, 3:04 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/04/24/fabio-rosati-the-biggest-unrec 
ognized-opportunity-in-the-sharing-economy/ (naming the potential of sharing time—sharing 
platforms that offer freelance labor—as the greatest opportunity in the sharing economy, with the 
potential to revolutionize small businesses and provide flexible employment). 
 260. EU Sharing Economy Report, supra note 195, at 16–17 (claiming that policy has yet to 
catch up with industry innovation and encouraging policymakers to take a light approach to 
regulation and to adopt policies that facilitate tech jobs and foster startups); see Metcalf & 
Warburg, supra note 62 (exhorting local regulators to put the sharing economy’s protection as its 
“first and primary” role and proposing that cities become early adapters, conduct studies 
documenting impact, and other activities helping foster the shared transaction activity). 
 261. See Sharing Economy Advisory Network Created As Resource for Cities, NAT’L 
LEAGUE OF CITIES (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.nlc.org/media-center/news-search/sharing-econ 
omy-advisory-network-created-as-resource-for-cities (announcing the establishment of the 
“Sharing Economy Advisory Network,” comprised of business, policy leaders, and city officials 
in compiling best practices across jurisdictions, noting the difficulty that cities have encountered 
in creating such practices on their own and seeking a consistent approach across jurisdictions); 
Brian Heaton, Sharing Economy Advisory Network Seeks to Develop Best Practices, GOV’T TECH. 
(Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/transportation/Cities-Form-Sharing-Economy 
-Network.html (quoting a Lyft director as commenting that such a network will help communities 
because it is “easier for communities to take advantage of the benefits the sharing economy 
provides if there are consistent regulations across the board”). 
 262. See BOS. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF URB. MECHANICS, http://www.newurbanmechanics 
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As discussed in Section I.B, certain areas of the sharing economy 
seem to call for regulatory intervention, while other areas are suited to 
self-regulation. As discussed in Section II, however, even the decision 
to regulate comes with many choices: whether to proceed unilaterally 
or with some level of industry buy-in, what activities to ban or control, 
what interest groups to appease. As discussed in Section III.B, 
discerning which battles to fight and how to fight them requires 
analysis that takes into account the industry’s incentives for self-
regulation or cooperation, the risks of foregoing regulation, the costs of 
implementing regulation, and the likelihood of effectiveness. 
Given the current sharing economy dynamics discussed in Section 
III.B, we suggest that the areas of greatest unmet need lie in labor 
protections and third-party protections, such as using tax policy to 
adjust for externalities and impact on the local economy. Consumer 
protections and regulation of deceptive speech are probably low areas 
of priority, as the market already has economic and reputational in-
centives to make reasonable judgment calls about how safe is safe 
enough.263 Although manipulation of ratings, dishonest reviews, and 
inaccuracies may exist, industry has incentives to crack down on the 
most egregious manipulations and to protect speech. Moreover, state 
law already provides laws relating to unfair practices for those in-
stances where industry may be complicit in distorting users’ speech 
deceptively, minimizing the risk of complete market failure in the 
absence of sharing economy-specific regulation.264 Therefore, regu-
lators looking to prioritize their efforts might see regulation of speech 
.org/boston/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014); S.F. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF CIVIC INNOVATION, 
http://innovatesf.com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014); Ruth Reader, New York City Gets a Chief 
Technology Officer, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 9, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014 
/09/09/new-york-city-gets-a-chief-technology-officer/ (discussing the recently launched New 
York City Mayor’s Office of Technology and Innovation). 
 263. See Paul Brady, Six Tips for First-Time Airbnb Renters, CONDÉ NAST TRAVELER (Jan. 
14, 2014), http://www.cntraveler.com/daily-traveler/2014/01/six-tips-for-first-time-airbnb 
-renters (providing an overview of common market know-how safeguards that allow users to 
match expectations about what risks and benefits they are undertaking). 
 264. See Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing 
Economy, supra note 22; Sundararajan, Trusting the ‘Sharing Economy’ to Regulate Itself, supra 
note 24 (stating view that companies have significant internal incentives to self-police the 
accuracy of their reviews); see also Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman Announces Agreement 
With 19 Companies To Stop Writing Fake Online Reviews and Pay More Than $350,000 in Fines, 
N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov 
/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-19-companies-stop-writing-fake-online 
-reviews-and (reporting on sting operation, investigating under state false advertising legal theory, 
that caught fake reviews on reputation industry sites such as Yelp and won agreements from 
offending companies, and noting Yelp’s positive response to state law enforcement tracking down 
manipulators left unchecked by their own filters). 
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particular to sharing economies as marginal enough of a concern to pass 
on it. Any attempts to co-regulate in these areas need not be 
comprehensive or particularly intrusive. Co-regulation in this area may 
look more like facilitating industry self-regulation, such as promoting 
certification to demonstrate compliance with industry best practices or 
obtaining informal commitments from companies to voluntarily 
disclose or adhere to certain reporting standards.265 
On the other hand, regulators are not necessarily always looking 
for areas of greatest need. Where there is a vacuum of preexisting 
consensus, industry leadership, or natural incentives to act, the 
government may need to take on the formidable task of identifying 
potential leaders, wooing over divergent interests to compromise on 
common ground, and building a coherent policy from the ground up 
that takes into account many interests. Regulators may alternatively 
look for low-hanging fruit, or at least meaningful reform where much 
of the legwork of building public attention and industry cooperation 
has already occurred. Already we are seeing some of this practical 
prioritizing in California’s recent focus on the liability issue. Some 
companies, particularly in the ride share sector, have already made 
transparency in liability allocation an important part of their business 
and public face.266 Because of recent high-profile accidents, 
particularly those occurring during “insurance gaps,” sharing compa-
nies have willingly adopted increasingly progressive policies on their 
own.267 Airbnb has also evolved its insurance policies.268 What is 
occurring is a maturation of the market as an expectation of liability 
allocation is more firmly incorporated within the business models. 
Politicians built on the emerging trend, making explicit by law what 
was already fast becoming an industry practice.269 Another area we see 
as practically feasible (as well as an area of need identified earlier) is 
in tax regulation. Companies eager to gain official recognition of their 
legitimacy and to reduce the appearance illegality or risk for their 
 265. See generally Cannon, supra note 176, at 463–66 (discussing ways in which voluntary 
obligations can complement regulatory goals). 
 266. See, e.g., Andre Haddad, RelayRides Insurance Update, RELAYRIDES BLOG (Nov. 13, 
2013), http://blog.relayrides.com/2013/11/relayrides-insurance-update/ (describing broadly the 
non-confidential aspects of how their insurance policy settled an earlier RelayRides accident and 
promoting its safety and liability insurance features to the public in company blog). 
 267. See, e.g., Nairi, supra note 236; Shafer, supra note 34. 
 268. Airbnb’s $1,000,000 Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, http://www.airbnb.com/guarantee (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (advertising their willingness to cover certain types of damages but 
cautioning that they are not insurers and describing a detailed process for claiming 
reimbursement). 
 269. See White, supra note 57. 
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individual users appear willing to compromise to demands of tax 
remittance, record-keeping, and co-enforcement against noncompliant 
users.270 
Also based on the Section III.B analysis, one area of high need but 
challenging feasibility appears to be labor regulation. The issue of the 
fair treatment of labor is likely to prove the thorniest and most variable 
aspect of the sharing economy’s maturation. Because of the fluidity of 
the employment relationship and the degrees to which an individual 
peer service or good provider can elect to work for a sharing platform, 
labor protections defy uniform application. While this parallels the 
dialogue on proper labor protections for freelancers, the sharing 
economy frequently involves far less experienced labor providers (in 
addition to the freelancers that are also moving to services as ways of 
supplementing or re-orienting their income). There does not appear to 
be strong market or government consensus on how one should 
approach the regulation of labor offered through online sharing 
platforms, partially because the market remains highly fragmented with 
many subsectors and variations on what kind of services and how one 
shares. Because of the divergent business models, types of services, 
and types of employees or independent service providers at stake, there 
is little consensus or likelihood of wholly industry-driven consensus. 
This leads to a lack of clearly identifiable or credible leadership, 
although modest attempts to “organize” have occurred, whether by 
traditional unions (who appear currently ill-equipped to address the 
needs of a more independent, diffuse online base) or internally within 
the online communities themselves.271 But this does not mean that 
 270. See Barrabi, supra note 218; Frank Rosario et al., Airbnb Renter Returns to 
‘Overweight Orgy,’ N.Y. POST (Mar. 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/17/air 
bnb-renter-claims-he-returned-home-to-an-orgy/ (reporting on Airbnb’s claim that it is kicking 
out users who abuse their platform to facilitate illegal or prohibited activity and intends to 
cooperate with law enforcement). 
 271. Maya Kosoff, Uber Drivers Protest: ‘You Can’t Make a Living Working Only for 
Uber,’ BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:26 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-new-york 
-city-office-protests-2014-9 (reporting on first attempt of freelancer ridesharing drivers, organized 
via Facebook, to protest their platform for cutting rates to remain competitive but passing on all 
costs of the cut to the drivers); Alison Griswold, Uber Just Caved on a Big Policy Change After 
Its Drivers Threatened to Strike, SLATE MONEYBOX BLOG (Sept. 12, 
2014, 1:03PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/09/12/uber_drivers_strike_they_ 
protested_cheap_uberx_fares_uber_backed_down.html (reporting on the concessions achieved 
after the Uber Drivers Network strike in New York City); see also About Peers, PEERS, 
http://www.peers.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (stating the purpose of Peers, a coalition 
of sharing-economy supporters, but showing a leadership largely representative of companies and 
organizations that promote sharing platforms, rather than of users or labor); Network for New 
Mutualism, FREELANCERS UNION, http://www.freelancersunion.org/network/ (last visited Sept. 
24, 2014) (referring to themselves as a “network,” comprised of businesses, think tanks, as well 
 
09_ARTICLE_CANNON+CHUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2015  4:41 PM 
96 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
government cannot intervene in this area. The intervention, however, 
must look more foundational, to identify areas of common ground or 
to build it from the ground up. Because there is not a strong recognition 
in the public or in the user base of the sharing platforms of the need for 
regulation in this area, labor protections are not yet a high-priority in 
sharing economy corporate culture. Co-regulators seeking to become 
active in this area must recognize that co-regulation at this stage in the 
game looks less like traditional lawmaking and more like community 
organizing: mobilizing public awareness of labor protection shortfalls, 
identifying and promoting potential allies or leadership in the industry 
or among the users, and building the groundwork for a shared culture 
of priorities. 
In short, the negotiations and the cooperation that constitute co-
regulation may look very different depending on the circumstances, 
and it is important to be reasoned and precise on why one selects certain 
priorities and approaches. Whether co-regulation looks like goal-
setting or legislation, convening groups and building consensus or 
demanding accountability and publicizing shortcomings, or separated 
spheres of activity for industry and government or joint projects, 
government and industry leaders should assess how the natural land-
scape of the economies affects the need for the intervention and the 
feasibility of their chosen method of accomplishing policy goals. Co-
operation between the government and industry, though necessary 
because of complementary strengths and powers, is notoriously diffi-
cult, and its relationships, fragile. Operating with clearly articulated 
reasons for each choice of approach and selection of goals will help 
partnerships stay the course, adhering to long-term outcomes and 
tailoring approaches to the more inherent attributes of sharing 
economies while remaining flexible enough to adjust co-regulatory 
relationships to the fast-moving circumstances and variations on a 
theme that the quick evolution of these economies presents. 
as unions and individuals).  
 
